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The US military has proven its strengths many times over through its ability to 
dominate opponents on the conventional battlefield. However, when it comes to irregular 
wars and insurgent conflicts, which are defined by enemies who conduct war from the 
shadows and refuse to meet on the open field, achieving success has been far more 
difficult. The nature and dynamics of these unconventional wars are dramatically 
different from the conventional warfare realm, and require innovative approaches and 
rethinking of many long held conceptions of waging war.   
Conducting unconventional warfare has been the core mission of US Army 
Special Forces (USSF) since they were founded in 1952.  Throughout a relatively short 
history, USSF have shown a broad utility in conducting operations with indigenous 
military, paramilitary, and civilian personnel in “irregular wars” and low intensity 
conflicts (LICs), and thus Special Forces have been widely regarded as the preeminent 
experts in this particular field of warfare.  Now more than ever, the capabilities of Special 
Forces are invaluable in supporting US national security strategy, continuing the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT), and supporting efforts to transform military capabilities for 
irregular warfare and unconventional conflicts. USSF are now faced with a difficult 
challenge: high demand and operations tempo require that USSF must find new ways to 
more effectively and efficiently employ their skills in unconventional environments.   
In order to enhance the capabilities of USSF in conducting unconventional 
warfare and counterinsurgency, this thesis proposes that USSF develop a training 
program that allows recruitment and selection of both indigenous personnel and US 
foreign-born as auxiliaries and surrogates to USSF operations. Training would take place 
in the US and would be for the explicit purpose of creating indigenous cadres for 
assisting Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) in developing 
operational/security forces and intelligence networks at the local level in order to create 






















Thesis Statement and Methodology: The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
practicality and feasibility of a program that allows USSF teams to recruit indigenous 
personnel and US foreign-born for training in the US as auxiliary forces in order to assist 
USSF teams in forming security and intelligence networks at the local level in 
unconventional conflict areas. More specifically, this thesis argues that an Auxiliary 
Training Program for Special Forces will dramatically improve the capabilities and 
effectiveness of Special Forces in establishing and maintaining local control in UW 
environments, thereby improving security and intelligence, reducing the ability of 
insurgent forces to conduct operations, and reducing the need for a large US military 
footprint. 
Counterinsurgency: A Different Kind of War:  Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs) 
and unconventional wars have surpassed large-scale conventional conflicts as the biggest 
threat to peace and global stability.  The US military has been organized, trained and 
equipped to deal with threats from other state military forces, so a gap in capabilities 
exists between the force we have and the force we need to defeat enemies that fight from 
the shadows and use the basic precepts of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Because 
unconventional/insurgent wars operate on wholly different principles than conventional 
wars, new approaches must be taken to transform US military capabilities.  Measures that 
focus purely on the destruction of the enemy no longer suffice—unconventional wars 
require our forces to have the ability to change the environment at the grass roots level so 
that the insurgents become ineffectual. Using auxiliary forces is one such method to 
establish control at the local level and Special Forces are well suited for the task of 
training and utilizing auxiliaries in counter-insurgency operations.  
  Auxiliary Training Program for Special Forces:  This chapter presents the 
proposal for the Auxiliary Training Program. This proposal is a framework for recruiting, 
training and employing auxiliaries in counter-insurgency operations.  The program 
consists of two distinct groups needed for maximum effectiveness: an asset force 
comprised of US foreign-born citizens with language and local expertise; and the 
 viii
indigenous auxiliaries who are recruited directly out of the local population in the target 
country. Using the advantages of “distance training” in the US and “combined 
formations” with Special Forces teams, these auxiliaries will greatly enhance US counter-
insurgency capabilities.  
Supporting Discussion:  This chapter discusses other advantages of the Auxiliary 
Training Program. The program utilizes distance training and combined formations; helps 
enhance language capabilities; and capitalizes on using pre-existing social networks to 
gain intelligence and influence the local population.  Shortfalls and problems like security 
issues, vetting personnel, and trying to transform corrupt systems and organizations are 
also candidly discussed.  Also discussed are the roles of Special Forces and conventional 
units in counterinsurgency, and recommendations for additional roles that they may need 
to perform to increase the effectiveness of COIN operations.   
Case Studies: SOF Missions with Auxiliary and Indigenous Forces:  By using 
inductive methodology case studies, this portion of the thesis argues that SOF and other 
specialized units can be highly effective when their abilities are combined with the local 
knowledge and cultural expertise of indigenous auxiliary forces.  By using studies of the 
Jedburgh teams of Southern France in WWII, the SAS and the Omani irregulars in the 
Dhofar War, and Executive Outcomes and irregular forces in Angola, this chapter will 
illustrate how elite units working with auxiliary forces have been able to successfully 
defeat their numerically superior opponents in protracted, strategic conflicts. 
Conclusion: Finally, the thesis concludes by recognizing that counterinsurgency 
is a complex problem that requires more than an “off the shelf” conventional military 
solution. Although the Auxiliary Training Program would not be a panacea for defeating 
insurgents, it is a sound method for gaining control and establishing long-term stability at 
the local level and could help define US counterinsurgency strategy for the future. Areas 
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1 
I. COUNTERINSURGENCY: A DIFFERENT KIND OF WAR 
The most common type of threat today comes not from standing armies of 
enemy states but from groups that wage war from the shadows, wearing 
no uniforms and claiming no state but able to wreak havoc by using the 
basic precepts of guerrilla warfare.1   
- Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos 
 
A.  BACKGROUND 
Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the biggest 
threat to peace and global stability has shifted from major wars waged by state sponsored 
militaries, to one of shadow conflicts conducted by sub-state groups and transnational 
terrorist networks conducting unconventional warfare (UW) campaigns around the globe. 
For generations, the US military has been organized, trained and equipped for threats 
from the former. Thus, a significant gap in capabilities—between the force we have and 
force we need—now exists that is perhaps best illustrated by current operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, where US troops (the bulk of which are conventional US Army) 
are having great difficulty in establishing long-term security and stability against 
insurgent forces— enemies which rely predominantly on guerrilla and terrorist tactics. 
While these irregular wars or low-intensity conflicts (LICs) have historically been 
the “Achilles heel” of conventional military forces, they continue to be the “predominant 
form of contemporary war.”2 These wars are protracted campaigns, stretched out by their 
perpetrators in ways that significantly challenge both political and military efforts. The 
preferred means by which the enemy chooses to fight in such conflicts often undermines 
the advantages of the biggest and most advanced regular military forces. In these 
unconventional wars, conventional military forces are frequently rendered impractical at 
best; at worst, such forces become liabilities and impediments to success. Also, because 
                                                 
 1 Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos (NY: PublicAffairs, 2004), xvi. 
 2 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (NY: The Free Press, 1991) According to van 
Creveld “since 1945 there have been perhaps 160 armed conflicts around the world…of those, perhaps 
three quarters have been of the so-called ‘low-intensity’ variety.”  He also states that LIC is “by far the 
most important form of armed conflict in our time.” p. 20-22.   
2many of the places US military forces must now operate are increasingly hostile to 
US/Western policies and ideals, a large presence of US forces is more likely to be seen as 
a foreign occupation and can be counterproductive toward achieving our strategic goals.  
The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states:  
 
Today, efforts large and small on five continents demonstrate the 
importance of being able to work with and through partners, to operate 
clandestinely and to sustain a persistent but low-visibility presence. Such 
efforts represent an application of the indirect approach to the long war.3 
 
Forces that can conduct protracted, complex and sensitive operations with 
indigenous personnel in UW environments with a reduced US footprint will be 
increasingly in demand.   
Since the attacks of 9/11, US Army Special Forces (USSF) have played a vital 
role in the Global War on Terror.  In Afghanistan, small numbers of USSF showed great 
utility in conducting operations in concert with Northern Alliance forces to depose the 
Taliban and displace Al Qaeda from their safe havens.  In Iraq, two battalions of USSF 
along with Kurdish “Peshmerga” fighters were able to seize the northern cities of Mosul 
and Kirkuk, thereby providing a vital economy of force to conventional mechanized units 
by allowing them to focus their efforts elsewhere.  While USSF played a primary role in 
the initial major combat operations in both Afghanistan and Northern Iraq, the tables 
have turned and they are now in a supporting role to the main effort of conventional 
forces in both theaters. It is possible to question the wisdom of this reversal of roles and it 
may well be that USSF should be the dominant force in establishing security and control 
at the local level in these types of conflicts.  Yet this would require cost-effective force 
multipliers who, in addition, would also provide the means to reach down into the local 
community.   
 
 
                                                 
 3 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Department of Defense, 6 February 2006); available from 
http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report, 11.  Internet; cited 3 March 2006. 
31.   Purpose/Thesis Statement 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the practicality and feasibility of a 
program that allows USSF teams to recruit indigenous personnel and US foreign-born 
citizens for training in the US as auxiliary forces in order to assist USSF teams in forming 
security and intelligence networks at the local level in unconventional conflict areas. 
More specifically, this thesis argues that an Auxiliary Training Program for Special 
Forces will dramatically improve the capabilities and effectiveness of Special Forces in 
establishing and maintaining local control in UW environments, thereby improving 
security and intelligence, reducing the ability of insurgent forces to conduct operations, 
and reducing the need for a large US military footprint.  
Although a program of this nature would have broad uses in guerrilla warfare, 
peacekeeping, nation-building and other unconventional missions, this study will be 
limited to discussing its applications in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. This is the 
area with the highest potential payoff, and the one most critical today with operations 
bogging down in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  
This program is not intended to be a panacea for defeating insurgents, and should 
be implemented as part of a strategy that focuses on the indirect approach to 
counterinsurgency (along the lines of Dr. Gordon McCormick’s “Diamond Model” and 
Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, Jr.’s “Oil Spot” method), rather than current attempts being 
made to apply conventional warfare measures to an unconventional problem. The aim 
here is to focus and enhance successful traditional COIN practices of working “by, with 
and through” the local population to establish local security, provided primarily by local 
irregulars, police or paramilitary forces. Similarly, a US trained auxiliary force will 
sharpen traditional COIN practices of relying on “grass roots” intelligence, implementing 
civic action programs, gaining unity of effort with locals, and will help bridge the cultural 
gaps that exist between US forces and native populations.  
 
2.   Methodology 
The following methodology will be employed in this thesis: Chapter I includes the 
thesis’ background, purpose, methodology, and outline. This chapter will go on to discuss 
the current problems the US military faces in conducting counterinsurgency campaigns 
4and will present a deductive framework which will enable the reader to understand the 
conceptual problems of insurgent conflicts and how they differ from conventional wars. 
This chapter will also describe the US Army’s ongoing struggle to define its niche in 
insurgent wars, the need to move current capabilities towards the unconventional warfare 
realm, and why a program to train auxiliaries would enhance capabilities on many 
different levels.  Chapter II will present the auxiliary training concept in detail.  This 
chapter will address specifics of how to organize and implement an Auxiliary Training 
Program, and will highlight aspects necessary to run a program including recruiting, cost 
estimates, logistics and other requirements. Chapter III will discuss potential benefits and 
limitations of the Auxiliary Training Program, and will recommend roles for USSF and 
conventional forces in COIN operations. Chapter IV includes inductive methodology-
case studies.  The case studies will focus on three examples of small units in insurgent 
conflicts and how they utilized locals and irregular forces to achieve success.  Chapter V 
will summarize and conclude the thesis, as well as recommend further areas of research.   
 
B.   DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
In order to understand the value of the role auxiliary forces would play and their 
potential power in unconventional conflicts, it is important to step outside the 
conventional frame of reference for warfare. Also, a critical analysis of how the US 
military organizes, prepares, and wages war must be made and contrasted to the reality of 
our current threats. In short, the means we have devised for waging wars is not meeting 
our needs to defeat enemies who refuse to submit to the force we continue to create. Our 
current enemies refuse to play by a set of rules that we have long taken for granted and 
assumed that everyone else will follow. 
 
1.  The Two Faces of Unconventional Warfare 
Unconventional Warfare is defined (and all too vaguely) by the Department of 
Defense as “the broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, predominantly 
conducted through, with or by indigenous or surrogate forces organized, trained, 
5equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source.”4 Absent in 
this definition is the recognition of the distinctive roles of the two competing sides in this 
type of conflict: a side playing the role of offense and a side on defense. Both sides are 
competing for legitimacy in a zero-sum game— “a contest of control over a fixed 
political space.”5 This “contest” is for the support of the population, which is the center 
of gravity in these types of conflicts (in contrast to conventional conflicts where the 
enemy’s military force is the center of gravity).  Essentially, UW is a strategy whereby 
either side is attempting to use the population as an indirect way to achieve its goals. 
Thus, the term “UW” can describe both sides of the same coin—measures taken by the 
offense and defense.  
On offense, there is a counter-state movement (also known as the resistance or 
insurgency), that is trying to overthrow or destabilize an existing government or authority 
by non-violent or violent means. Violent resistance by the counter-state includes 
subversive acts like sabotage, terrorism or guerrilla warfare.  
On defense, the government (or other form of authority) is trying to maintain 
power and legitimacy, and must employ measures (usually through an existing state 
security apparatus) in order to protect itself from lawlessness, subversion and insurgency.  
These measures, commonly called counterinsurgency (COIN), have taken many forms, 
and have often proved to be very manpower and resource intensive.  Efforts to conduct 
COIN can come at a high price, particularly for outside powers operating on foreign soil.  
When states try to apply conventional military measures toward solving an 





                                                 
 4 Department of the Army, FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 2001), 2-1. 
 5 Gordon McCormick, Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare class notes (Naval Postgraduate School, Spring 
2005). 
 
62.  The Curse of Counter-Insurgency  
Ha, ha! You fool! You fell victim to one of the classic blunders! The most 
famous is never get involved in a land war in Asia…! 
      -Vizzini, The Princess Bride 
 
Since the end of World War II and the advent of the nuclear age, the record of 
success for great powers conducting counter-insurgency abroad is abysmal.  In spite of 
ruthless measures, tremendous economic resources, sophisticated military technology and 
a myriad of other advantages, the “counter-insurgency” forces failed in virtually every 
case.6  While the bulk of these failures can be attributed to the third world colonial 
ventures of Western European powers, none have seen failure conducted on a grander 
scale than “superpower” nations.  
The US and the Soviet Union have fallen into the same trap as their smaller 
European counterparts, only they “super-sized” it. The US was dealt its first true military 
defeat in Vietnam against what was perceived to be a peasant, backwater enemy force 
from a fourth rate country.  The USSR suffered a similar defeat in Afghanistan when it 
was forced to withdraw at the hands of seemingly poorly trained and equipped 
“mujahideen” rebel fighters.  The US military was also forced out of Beirut, Lebanon, in 
1983 after the attack on the Marine Barracks, and then left Somalia in 1994 after efforts 
to bring security and stability failed, which culminated in the infamous “Black Hawk 
Down” incident in Mogadishu.  
Today, the US is fighting insurgencies on two fronts—Afghanistan and Iraq—
while Russia still struggles with a brutal Islamic insurgency in Chechnya. Why have 
materially and technologically superior forces that seemed to hold all the cards, such as 
the US Army, struggled against militarily and numerically inferior insurgent forces? 
 
                                                 
6 Van Creveld, 22-24. Highlighted examples of counterinsurgency failures: The British lost in India, 
Palestine, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden; the French lost in Indochina and Algeria; The Belgians surrendered the 
Congo; the Dutch lost Indonesia; the Spaniards yielded the Sahara; the Portuguese capitulated in Angola 
and Mozambique; the South Africans withdrew from Namibia; US failed in Vietnam and withdrew forces 
from Beirut; the USSR left in defeat in Afghanistan; and the Israelis were forced to withdraw from 
Lebanon.  The most notable and often-quoted exception is the British counterinsurgency mission in 
Malaya, which successfully defeated a communist insurgency. 
73.  US Problems with Counterinsurgency 
The cold, brutal fact is that much present-day military power is simply 
irrelevant as an instrument for extending or defending political interests 
over most of the globe; by this criterion indeed, it scarcely amounts to 
‘military power’ at all.7 
   -Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War 
 
US Army doctrine, “the officially sanctioned theory of victory outlining the 
conduct of war on all levels,” is essentially a blueprint for how the Army goes to war.8 
Doctrine is a product of the Army’s experiences, the creation of which has been in many 
respects an exercise in “highly selective historical interpretation.”9 The Army’s great 
victories in the major wars of the last century—WWI, WWII, and the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War, as well as generations spent preparing for large scale-warfare against the Soviet 
Union during the Cold War—shaped and defined the Army’s current doctrine.  
Victory in these major wars was generally achieved through a strategy of massed 
combat that relied on big units in fixed battles, advanced technology, overwhelming 
firepower, and other measures that maximized the destruction of the enemy’s forces on 
the battlefield (also referred to as “attrition warfare”). This type of doctrine is well and 
good for fighting a mirror-image enemy that chooses to fight on these same terms, but is 
inefficient and largely irrelevant when it comes to defeating opponents who fight from 
the shadows and refuse to meet on the open field.  According to Dr. Steven Metz, 
professor of national security affairs at the US Army War College Strategic Studies 
Institute, “Insurgents and terrorists avoid battle spaces where they are weakest—often the 
conventional military sphere—and focus on those where they can operate on more equal 
footing, particularly the psychological and the political.”10 Unlike conventional wars, 
victory in LICs and unconventional conflicts is obtained by “altering the political variable 
to the point where the enemy becomes ineffectual, and not by actually defeating enemies 
                                                 
7 Van Creveld, 27. 
8 Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths (NY: NYU Press, 1986), 3. 
9 Ibid, 113. 
10 Steven Metz, “Small Wars: From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges,” in Rethinking the 
Principles of War, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2005), 288.   
8in battle.”11 More importantly, current Army doctrine presents a diversion from the real 
tasks demanded of COIN operations.    
The Army is quite comfortable when it comes to application of heavy firepower 
(kinetic effects), conducting large-scale offensive operations (clear and sweep operations, 
cordons and searches), and performing Direct Action (DA) missions to kill or capture 
targeted personnel (“man-hunting” operations). However, it is far less adept at the 
difficult and often mundane tasks that are critical in COIN campaigns (i.e., implementing 
population control measures, training local security forces, gaining intimate local 
knowledge, and maintaining a persistent presence). It is little wonder that a mass and 
technologically driven force like the US Army is at odds when placed in a situation 
where a low tech, human-centered form of warfare is the order of the day.  
  
C. DETERMINING THE SOLUTION 
1. Lessons Ignored in Counterinsurgency 
It is ironic, then, that the Army and US military establishment is not without 
experience, or success for that matter, in unconventional wars. After being created out of 
an insurgency against British rule in 1776, the US military proved quite adept at “another, 
less celebrated tradition in US military history” of fighting “small wars” against irregular 
and guerrilla forces during the 1800s and early 1900s.12 Unfortunately, when it comes to 
learning lesson from these wars, our hindsight is not always 20/20, and experiences in 
these wars have often been poorly integrated into military doctrine. Many of these small 
wars—like the Indian Wars fought by the US Army on the western plains in the post 
Civil War period, and the Banana Wars fought by the US Marines in the Caribbean 
(Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua) from 1915-1934—were ultimately successful for 
reasons that were largely misunderstood, forgotten, ignored, or deemed irrelevant in 
fighting “real” wars where “vital” national interests were at stake.   
                                                 
11 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low–Intensity Warfare,” in National Security Management: 
Dimensions of Military Strategy, ed. George E. Thibault (Washington, DC: National Defense University 
Press, 1987), 340. 
12 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace (NY: Basic Books, 2002), xiv. 
9Success in defeating guerrilla and insurgent forces in these small wars was 
generally achieved through protracted campaigns that depended on creating and 
employing security forces at the local level. Also, operations were conducted by units 
that, for mostly budgetary and political reasons, were restricted in numbers and resources. 
While constraints on force size were likely looked upon with displeasure by military 
planners and leaders, they came with several fortuitous side-effects. Although public and 
political scrutiny during these periods was not an issue to the extent that this has become 
post-Vietnam, circumstances forced these units to conduct operations with a relatively 
small footprint, which allowed them to avoid the normal scrutiny of the public eye 
(remaining “under the radar”) and thus were able to maintain a persistent presence. These 
situations also compelled US forces to interact with and rely heavily on indigenous 
personnel to help achieve their goals.  
US Marines in the Banana Wars were comfortable with engaging the local 
population and were able to work through the locals to develop constabularies (a local 
body of security forces) which focused on internal defense.13 By co-opting locals for the 
tasks of security, they were able to separate the guerrillas from their popular support 
bases and gain intelligence that was vital to quelling the insurgents and establishing and 
maintaining local security and order.  
Because of Congressional economizing, Army Cavalry units in the Indian Wars 
were able to recruit Indians into their force as scouts in their efforts to police the region 
(an area roughly half the size of the continental US) and promote peace between the 
tribes. These Indian auxiliaries became so indispensable to the Army that “in every case 
of actual or potential conflict between Indians and whites, Indians were called on to help 
to defeat the hostiles or to prevent hostilities from breaking out.”14  
Measures used in these small wars came with the added benefit of forcing the men 
to become intimately acquainted with the locals and gain a cultural understanding that 
was vital to acquiring the good intelligence that is a “prerequisite for effective 
                                                 
13 Cable, 107 and Boot, 288. 
14 Thomas W. Dunlay, Wolves for the Blue Soldiers (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1982), 68. 
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counterinsurgency operations.”15  Local knowledge, even as limited as it was in some 
cases, allowed these units to be able to tap into the great resources of human capital that 
were available as a result. By using the people to defeat an enemy derived from the 
people, these soldiers and marines happened upon the most practical way to defeat 
insurgents.  Their success was not achieved as a result of a well conceived master plan or 
grand strategy, but arose out of simple pragmatism.   
Over the years, the Army has developed a general distaste for irregular wars and 
as Edward Luttwak notes, “the Defense Establishment as a whole still operates under the 
implicit assumption that ‘low-intensity’ warfare is merely a lesser included case of ‘real’ 
war.”16  It is because of this that irregular and unconventional conflicts are seen as a 
distraction from “real” war, and have been considered the exception and not the norm 
when it comes to warfare.  Developing capabilities for these types of conflicts has taken a 
backseat to preparing for large-scale conventional operations (where the stakes were 
considered much higher), and lessons taken from these wars emphasized aspects that 
appealed to the Army’s long held concept of massed warfare. It is largely for these 
reasons that an effective counterinsurgency doctrine has eluded the US Army and the US 
military establishment in general. 
 
2. Local Control: The Heart and Soul of Counterinsurgency 
Efforts at winning the hearts of the people will come to naught, however, 
if the insurgent is able to control the population by “winning their minds” 
through terror, assassination, and reprisals for pro-government activities. 
In short, physical security is the sine qua non in any strategy aimed at 
defeating an insurgent movement.17   
-Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.  
 
The most effective way to beat insurgents is to adopt a strategy that places the 
highest priority on gaining control of the local population (establishing security and the 
rule of law), and less emphasis on targeting and hunting down insurgents (as is the case 
                                                 
15 Boot, 127. 
16 Luttwak, 335. 
17 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1986), 216. 
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with US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan). While being proficient at capturing 
insurgents is a necessary and important task, it cannot be the campaign strategy around 
which everything else revolves.   Direct Action (DA) missions that are driven by reliable 
intelligence are intrinsic to COIN, but operations that serve as “fishing expeditions” in 
order to gain intelligence or to “flush out” insurgents should be avoided because they are 
less productive and often backfire by antagonizing the population. 
 Claiming that an insurgency cannot be defeated merely by killing or neutralizing 
insurgents may seem counterintuitive, but this is one of many paradoxes of insurgent 
warfare that is difficult to grasp for a military that has been raised on a diet of mass 
warfare. To explain: the insurgents and their terror activities are the product of a system 
that requires money, food, training, recruits, materials, weapons, safe-havens, information 
and, most important, the support of a few and the absolute indifference of everyone else.  
As T.E. Lawrence said: 
Rebellion…must have a population sympathetic to the point of not 
betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by two 
percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively 
sympathetic…18 
 
In other words, the essence of the problem is that it is the attitude of the 
population that permits a rebellion to exist.19 If the government cannot provide basic 
needs and security to the people and neglects its citizens’ demands for social change 
(prompted by corruption, injustices, abuses within the system, etc.), motive and 
opportunity for insurgency and rebellion will be created. It is out of this “disequilibrium” 
that insurgents find ways to exploit social grievances, inequities and government 
weakness to their advantage and set the stage for revolution.20  
The local population is the “Petri-dish” that breeds and supports the insurgents, 
therefore gaining and maintaining local control is the essential element of any 
counterinsurgency strategy, without which there is simply nothing to build upon. For an 
                                                 
18 T.E. Lawrence, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1950, Vol. X,  953. 
19 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts, (Chicago: The Rand Corporation, 1970), Ch 2, p. 6-27 
20 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1982), 
Ch 4. 
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occupying force, no amount of focus or success in any other tasks—such as holding 
elections, solving infrastructure problems with civil projects, or capturing high value 
targets like Saddam or al Qaeda’s top leadership—can compensate for a shortfall in the 
area of local control.  Local control is defined as “being able to see everything that occurs 
and being able to influence what is occurring.”21 Achieving local control should be 
viewed as the “decisive point,” if indeed there can be a decisive point in a 
counterinsurgency campaign.   
Only by maintaining a 24/7 presence that uses population control measures like 
curfews, entry/exit checkpoints to population centers, monitoring techniques like 
biometric ID cards, and other tactics and measures that are more akin to policing and 
nation-building than offensive military operations, can we hope to establish local control 
and gain legitimacy in insurgent conflict areas.  
The mastery of these techniques by communist regimes is largely the reason that 
they have been notoriously difficult to topple using unconventional warfare measures.  
Communist government control over people runs so deeply and effectively at the lowest 
levels that it leaves no contested space in which insurgents/counter-state forces can 
operate, even if the government is abusive and overwhelmingly unpopular among the 
people. Conversely, a similar systematic “bottom-up” approach to mobilizing populations 
for what Mao Zedong referred to as “people’s war” is why communism was able to 
spread steadily in many weakly governed third world countries during the Cold War 
years.  This is not to suggest that the US military should adopt communist-like practices 
in conducting counterinsurgency, but there may be certain security measures that can be 
adopted and improved upon that do not compromise our democratic values.  
Of course, an outside military force operating on foreign land faces a “Catch-22” 
situation in which the very presence of the large numbers of troops necessary to 
implement effective security can likewise fuel anti-government sentiment and insurgent 
activity.  This is particularly so when the outside force is not meeting the expectations of 
the locals when it comes to providing security and other basic needs and services. In 
                                                 
 21 Gordon McCormick, Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare class notes (Naval Postgraduate School, Spring 
2005). 
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reference to the British efforts in Malaya and other successful COIN efforts during the 
last century, Dr. James S. Corum states: 
Even if foreign forces had to carry the main burden for a time, the 
preference of the defending government has been to employ foreign 
security forces only as long as absolutely necessary, with the ideal being 
the creation of local forces capable of defeating insurgents with minimal 
support from foreign forces. Simply put, enabling an indigenous 
government to fight its own war is a key element of a sound 
counterinsurgent strategy.22 
 
Therefore, efforts to create an environment that makes insurgent activity difficult 
and fosters cooperation with locals to the point where they can be placed in charge of 
their own security must be swift and deliberate.  
Instead of concentrating the bulk of our efforts on building centralized state forces 
in the image of our own military (like the Iraqi National Guard and the Afghan National 
Army), a solution that is more appropriate to the nature of the problem of insurgencies is 
to begin establishing security forces and intelligence/informant networks made up of the 
local populace in every village and town where insurgents operate. This is a much more 
effective and practical means of providing on-the-ground intelligence and exerting 
influence over the rest of the population than the temporary presence of a centralized 
state military force, which may drive out insurgents for a short term, but will leave a 
population vulnerable to insurgent influence when these state forces must inevitably 
withdraw.    
Mao Zedong made the allusion that guerrillas exist among the population like 
“fish in the sea.” Much like draining a fish tank, if you can separate the insurgents from 
the population, the insurgency has no chance of sustaining itself.  This indirect approach 
targets the problem (the lack of physical security and local control), rather than the 
symptoms of the problem (the insurgents and their activities).  
This is the most efficient means of accomplishing the overall goal of eliminating 
the insurgency because it helps you attain all your other goals along the way.  Because 
                                                 
 22 James S. Corum, Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Insurgencies, 
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 1. 
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you must work by, with and through the locals, this helps you gain the trust, credibility, 
and legitimacy you need for them to start turning in their insurgent neighbors, and at the 
same time you are helping to build the infrastructure that you need in order to eventually 
implement an exit strategy. Co-opting locals for these tasks also reduces the amount of 
time and resources you must spend conducting intrusive sweeps, searches and offensive 
operations, which are counterproductive in the sense that they often have the unwanted 
side-effect of antagonizing and alienating the very people you are there to protect.   
 
3. A Call for Change 
Military conflict has changed and we have been reluctant to recognize it. 
Defeating nation-state forces in conventional battle is not the task for the 
21st century. Odd missions to defeat transnational threats or rebuild 
nations are the order of the day, but we haven’t yet adapted.23 
 
      -GEN Anthony Zinni, USMC, Retired 
 
According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department of 
Defense (DOD) is calling for sweeping changes within the military. The QDR states, “In 
the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of 
warfare confronting the United States, its allies and partners.”24 As the Pentagon moves 
to overhaul strategy by beginning to reverse decades of focus on conventional conflicts, it 
will look toward strengthening military capabilities in conducting counterinsurgency, 
counterterrorism and stabilization and reconstruction operations.  
The QDR acknowledges that irregular wars will demand very different skills from 
our troops, like being able to “understand foreign cultures and societies and possess the 
ability to train, mentor and advise foreign security forces.”25 Measures to improve 
performance in these campaigns must be realistic, visibly effective and come at a low 
cost.  A program that meets these criteria and improves efficiency for US forces in 
establishing short-term security at the local level in UW conflicts, while at the same time 
                                                 
23 Tom Clancy, with GEN Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, and Tony 
Koltz, Battle Ready (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 2004), 424. 
 24 2006 QDR, 36. 
 25 Ibid, 42. 
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laying the groundwork for the development of long-term stability, could help define US 
counterinsurgency strategy for the future. Establishing a program that capitalizes on the 
capabilities of auxiliary and surrogates would assist in filling many of these needs for the 
future.  
 
4.  Auxiliaries and Surrogates in COIN:  the Elegant Solution 
 As always, people, not technology, will make the difference…in short, we 
have to invest in the human capital that is the real key to future warfare.26 
-Thomas X. Hammes 
  
One of the most profound side-effects of the US military’s pursuit and heavy 
reliance on conventional war-fighting capabilities is that we have been precluded from 
needing a deep understanding of our enemies in order to beat them. According to Dr. 
Anna Simons, “To succeed in the past, we didn’t have to have the sort of small-unit 
cultural awareness that is being trumpeted today.”27 Even the most ardent conventional 
warriors would admit that finding the enemy, not fighting him, is one of the biggest 
problems the military is facing in Iraq and Afghanistan. Retired Maj. General Robert H. 
Scales states:  
This war [Iraq] will be won by fostering personal relationships, leveraging 
non-military advantages, reading intentions, building trust, converting 
opinions and changing perceptions, all tasks that demand an exceptional 
ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivations.28 
 
The military establishment is now beginning to acknowledge the importance of 
developing grassroots cultural awareness and the need for understanding how to leverage 
this knowledge to our advantage. While acknowledging the problem is a good first step, 
finding a viable solution could prove to be a difficult task.  Of course, continuing to push 
language skills and “cultural awareness training” is important, but comes with limitations 
                                                 
26 Thomas X. Hammes, “Rethinking the Principles of War: The Future of Warfare,” in Rethinking the 
Principles of War, ed. Anthony D. McIvor (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2005), 277.   
27 Anna Simons, “Seeing the Enemy (or Not),” in Rethinking the Principles of War, ed. Anthony D. 
McIvor (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 2005), 323. 
28 Robert H. Scales, “Human Intel vs. Technology: Cultural Knowledge important in Iraq,” 
Washington Times, 3 February 2005, 21. 
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and is far from a quick-fix solution. Deep cultural understanding takes time (sometimes a 
lifelong commitment) and patience to develop—two commodities which are generally in 
short supply when a democracy goes to war.  
At certain points in our nation’s past, we have looked to indigenous people to act 
as auxiliaries and surrogate forces to help meet these needs in times of conflict. The 
Army’s use of Indian auxiliaries during the Plains Wars wasn’t just for economic 
reasons; Indians proved indispensable to the Army’s efforts to police the western frontier, 
promote peace between the different tribes, and pave the way for western expansion. 
Indian auxiliaries provided skills as scouts, interpreters and intermediaries—skills that 
could not have been realistically cultivated by their white counterparts. The services of 
Indian auxiliaries proved to be so valuable to operations that “a school of thought had 
developed within the army, of indeterminate numbers but including experienced frontier 
officers, favoring some sort of permanent, systematic organization of Indian auxiliaries 
and scouts.”29 
The US Marines in the Banana Wars were able to complement their virtues of 
discipline and combat skills with the local knowledge and terrain familiarity of the 
irregular forces.  The Marines used an “institutionalized cross-cultural combat 
cooperation” of mixed formations which, according to Larry E. Cable, “had the best 
effect on civilian morale, as they were a highly visible sign of what would later be termed 
‘U.S. commitment.’ ”30    
Another illustrative example that highlights the concept of incorporating 
auxiliaries from target areas (perhaps more in theory than in practice) occurred during the 
Cold War with the passing of the Lodge Act of 1951. The Lodge Act was initially 
designed to assist the US military in creating a “foreign legion” of Eastern Block 
expatriates to be used against a Red Army invasion of Europe. While this idea never 
came to pass, the law was used by US Army Special Forces to fill its ranks with former 
Eastern Europeans for the purpose of creating teams to be dropped behind the Iron 
                                                 
29 Dunlay, 23-24. 
30 Cable, 107. 
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Curtain to train and lead partisan resistance movements.31 Although one can only 
speculate as to what degree this would have been successful had this mission been 
executed, the fact remains that a few individuals had the vision to plan for such a 
contingency, and to do so recognized they needed to rely heavily on the incorporation of 
native personnel.  A program of a similar nature could prove even more useful in today’s 
conflicts. 
Utilizing people in military operations that are from a target area and have a 
lifetime’s worth of knowledge about the inner workings of society at the micro-level has 
obvious benefits. Aside from language and cultural skills, natives have an “insider status” 
that can assist in gaining a unity of effort with the local population that we as outsiders 
might never achieve. This is particularly important in “non-Western” areas where we are 
conducting ongoing operations where our status as “outsiders” is even more evident. The 
next chapter will discuss a plan to recruit, train and incorporate auxiliary forces from 
target countries into UW/COIN operations by coalescing them into Special Forces teams 
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II. AUXILIARY TRAINING PROGRAM FOR SPECIAL FORCES  
A. AUXILIARY TRAINING PROGRAM OVERVIEW 
Maintaining a long-term, low visibility presence in many areas of the 
world where US forces do not traditionally operate will be required.  
Building and leveraging partner capacity will also be an absolutely 
essential part of this approach, and the employment of surrogates will be a 
necessary method for achieving many goals.32      
    
-2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
1. Definitions 
This portion of the study will use terms that Special Forces are familiar with in 
conducting guerrilla warfare campaigns and supporting resistance movements, only here 
they will be applied to COIN operations.  The terms “auxiliary” and “asset” will be 
borrowed from UW doctrine to define elements that will perform important roles in 
supporting COIN operations and keeping an existing government in power.   
Special Forces doctrine defines an “auxiliary” as the “the internal support element 
of the resistance movement whose organization and operation are both covert and 
clandestine in nature and whose members do not openly indicate their sympathy or 
involvement with the resistance movement.”33  For purposes of this study, the definition 
will apply to an organization of similar or mirrored purpose in counterinsurgency 
operations. The term “auxiliary” may also be used interchangeably with the terms 
“irregular” and “surrogate.” It is worth noting that circumstances of counterinsurgency 
operations would not necessarily require an auxiliary force to operate covertly or 
clandestinely, but the tasks of assisting in logistics, security, intelligence, recruiting, and 
helping to mobilize the population can make similar demands. Local indigenous people 
must be relied on to assume these roles when the existing host nation government 
infrastructure cannot, or in cases where a government’s influence does not extend 
everywhere within its own borders (i.e., the new Government of Afghanistan). In extreme 
                                                 
 32  2006 QDR, 36. 
 33  Special Forces Detachment Officer Qualification Course Summary Sheets, US Army John F. 
Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, June 1998, 103. 
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cases, USSF must be prepared to create and foster these capabilities out of the local 
populace from scratch. 
The term “asset” is commonly used to describe a member of a resistance 
movement or “insider” who can provide USSF valuable intelligence and insight for 
mission planning and operations.  It is generally understood that an asset has tactical 
information, local knowledge and influence that is useful when it comes to conducting 
UW. In a guerrilla warfare campaign, an asset might accompany an SF team during 
infiltration and link-up with the resistance movement. In COIN, the function of assets 
would be similar in this capacity, only instead of linking up with a resistance movement, 
they would accompany SF teams and assist in establishing relations with local 
government and/or key leaders in a specific area.  For this study, assets are construed to 
be an essential part of an auxiliary force, but their status will be different from indigenous 
auxiliaries because they will be recruited out of the US population, they will be a more 
permanent fixture on SF teams, and they will be acting as “facilitators” between USSF 
and the host nation because they have backgrounds and experience in two different 
cultures.   
 
2. Purpose 
The idea behind the Auxiliary Training Program is to develop a permanent, 
institutionalized system by which USSF can create professional cadres of auxiliaries for 
use in operations, particularly COIN operations, where long-term success depends 
predominantly on creating and improving local indigenous security forces.  While current 
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan are aimed at creating large quantities of state military and 
police forces trained in predominantly conventional military measures to hunt and root 
out insurgents (a top-down approach), this plan focuses on the development of basic 
security infrastructure at the village and town level in order to indirectly defeat insurgents 
by separating them from their popular support base (a bottom-up approach). The ideas 
presented here are by no means the only way of conducting such a program, and should 
be considered as a general framework for implementation.  
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This program is not an attempt to create more Special Forces, raise a “foreign 
legion,” or to rehash a “Bay of Pigs” style operation where groups of refugees are trained 
as a fighting force by the US and sent unilaterally to defeat a mutual enemy.34  Rather, 
the Auxiliary Training Program is intended as a “long haul” method to help defeat 
insurgent forces at the grass roots level by partnering indigenous regional experts with 
SF teams to create a continuous training “pipeline” for building a security infrastructure 
from the ground-up within a conflict area.  This training pipeline will produce the 
personnel core that the indigenous security force will be built around.  This program is a 
relatively inexpensive and alternative means of fostering an effective security apparatus 
in a target country, a way of cultivating broader and deeper knowledge of specific areas 
of operation, and of demonstrating long-term US commitment to our allies and partners 
in helping to rebuild conflict areas. 
 
3.  Method 
Once a country has been identified as a potential target for US military 
intervention (or perhaps at its request for US assistance), the basic concept of the plan is 
to immediately begin recruiting people within the US who have local knowledge of the 
target country (preferably foreign-born expatriates with pre-existing language skills, 
cultural knowledge, social ties with people in their native country, etc.) and assign them 
to Special Forces Operations Detachment Alphas (SFODAs) as “assets” to assist with 
mission planning, training and operations. This process can begin well in advance of an 
anticipated US military strike or invasion.  
Once the SFODAs and their assets are inside the target country (before, during or 
after US military action, depending on the situation), the assets would assist in building 
rapport and gaining legitimacy with local leaders and key personnel, and would help 
recruit and train locals as security forces.  The best and brightest of these local recruits 
would be identified, and volunteers from this group would accompany their respective 
                                                 
 34 “The Bay of Pigs” was a failed attempt to overthrow the government of Fidel Castro in 1961 by 
using a group of CIA trained Cuban exiles in a clandestine amphibious invasion. The operation was 
intended to cause a chain reaction and inspire insurrection among the population, but ended in disaster.  
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SFODAs back to the US for more lengthy and in-depth training in security and COIN 
operations as “auxiliaries.”  
An initial group of these indigenous auxiliary recruits would be sent back 
immediately to train with the SF unit that has been identified as the follow-on force for 
the current SF unit in theater (follow-on forces are typically identified several months in 
advance). When the current SFODA in theater redeploys, it will take another group of 
recruits with it to train during its recovery cycle, while the incoming SF unit takes over 
and already has a working relationship with a group of auxiliaries that is trained and 
prepared to continue the mission.  On the ground, the auxiliaries assist the SF teams in 
training and employing locals for security measures and collecting intelligence. The 
security measures and intelligence networks must be continuously expanded and 
improved upon until there is no “contested space” left for the insurgents to operate in. 
This cycle would repeat with every operational rotation until the mission is complete and 
a US military presence in the target country is no longer deemed necessary. 
 
4. Endstate 
In short, the training of indigenous forces would simultaneously take place in the 
host country and in the US, and SF teams would never be out of contact with the local 
forces for lengthy periods as they currently tend to be when they redeploy and are on 
their “down cycles” between operational deployments.  SF teams would be committed to 
the same areas of operation over repeated rotations, instead of being shuffled from area to 
area to react to the demands of the immediate security situation on the ground.  
The net effect of this program is that, over time, it will help establish local control 
and create an environment inhospitable to insurgent activity. The program will foster a 
professional security apparatus within the target country, it will improve the language 
skills and cultural understanding of both the US forces and their counterparts, and it will 
build deeper, more personal ties and a sense of commitment to the target country—all of 
which are necessary in the long approach to success in COIN operations.   The following 
will focus on the creation of the two basic and interrelated components of the Auxiliary 
Training Program—the US assets and the indigenous auxiliary forces—as well as the 
function of the stateside training portion of the program.  
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B. RECRUITING  
1. Special Forces Assets: Recruiting Auxiliaries in the US 
That is where we are lucky. No other country has such a fund of men who 
speak the languages of the lands we must invade, who understand the 
ways and have tasted the wine of the land on the palate of their memories. 
This is a lucky thing for America.35 
        -John Hershey, A Bell for Adano, 1944 
 
Because circumstances may preclude USSF from initially being able to recruit 
individuals from the target country prior to an invasion or other military action, an 
auxiliary “asset” force should be organized within the US prior to any offensive action if 
the situation permits.  Although this asset force would be comprised primarily of US 
citizens who are foreign-born, it may also include foreign-born who are non-US citizens 
(refugees/displaced persons, etc.), or those in various stages of working towards US 
citizenship. This distinguishes “assets” from “indigenous auxiliaries” who are citizens of 
the host nation and are currently residing in the host nation.  
The goal of developing this asset force is to augment every SFODA with at least 
one person (preferably more) who is familiar with the culture, language and social 
structure of the target country. While many of the duties of assets would resemble those 
of interpreters, far more would be demanded of assets.  Assets would assist USSF teams 
in making the transition from initial combat operations to “Phase IV,” Support and 
Stability Operations (SASO), and COIN in the event that an insurgency arises in the post-
conflict environment. As area experts and advisors, assets would assist USSF in being 
able to quickly establish initial contact with local leaders and people of influence in their 
areas of operation, as well as assist in recruiting and training indigenous personnel for 
creating local security forces.   
Fortunately, the ideal place to look for recruiting potential candidates for the asset 
force is in the US. Since the US is an immigrant nation, we have an extraordinary 
reservoir of foreign expertise found within our own population. Using the populations of 
Iraqis and Afghanis that live in the US as an illustrative example (see Tables 1 and 2), 
                                                 
35 John Hershey, A Bell for Adano (NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944), 2. 
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there are a substantial number of individuals from these countries who could potentially 
be recruited into service as assets.   
 
Table 1. US Foreign Born in Afghanistan36  Table 2. US Foreign Born in Iraq37 
 
When looking to plan contingencies for potential opponents like Iran or China, 
the numbers of US foreign born are even greater (see Tables 3 and 4). 
 




While small numbers of US foreign-born are serving in our efforts abroad as 
interpreters, translators, and in other capacities, efforts to recruit foreign-born citizens 
with backgrounds from present conflict areas into military service have been weak or 
non-existent.  According to the Migration Policy Institute, of the approximately 69,300 
foreign-born serving the US Armed Forces, only 800 are from south-central Asian 
                                                 
36 Profile of Selected Demographic and Social Characteristics, Year 2000, US Census Bureau, Table 
FBP-1. [Web site]; available from http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-
afghanistan.pdf; Internet; cited 10 January 2006.  
37 Ibid, http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-iraq.pdf. Internet; cited 10 
January 2006. 
38 Ibid, http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-iran.pdf. Internet; cited 10 
January 2006. 
39 Ibid,http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/stp-159/STP-159-china(inclTaiwan).pdf. Internet; 
cited 10 January 2006. 
Statistics from the US Census Bureau, Year 2000  
US Population of People Born in Afghanistan 
Population 18 years and over………………..…………40,910 
 Male………………………………………..20,985 
 Female……………………………………...19,925
Statistics from the US Census Bureau, Year 2000  
US Population of People Born in Iran 
Population 18 Years and over……..…………………..269,625 
 Male……………………………………….145,630 
 Female……………………………………..123,995 
Statistics from the US Census Bureau, Year 2000 
US Population of People Born in Iraq 
Population 18 years and over……….…………………79,760 
 Male………………………………………..44,465 
 Female……………………………………..35,295 
Statistics from the US Census Bureau, Year 2000 
US Population of People Born in China (including Taiwan) 




countries, and 325 are from western Asian (Middle East) countries.40   This should be 
reason for concern considering these regions include Iraq and Afghanistan, which 
constitute the central focus of the Global War on Terror, and US forces have now had a 
presence there for several years. These numbers reveal either a lack of emphasis, or a 
lack of effectiveness on behalf of the US military in recruiting people with backgrounds 
and non-combat skills from these critical regions. 
USSF has its own recruiting apparatus, which is primarily used to draw in SF 
candidates from the ranks of the Army. However, the duties of SF recruiters could be 
expanded to recruit for the Auxiliary Training Program and to reach out to specific 
foreign-born communities within the US. Recruiting could also be conducted through the 
assistance of dissident and exile groups as well as informal leaders and other 
organizations within these ethnic communities in the US.   
The US has relied on its foreign-born population and non-citizens in the past for 
assistance in military endeavors; this a resource that should not be ignored as a potential 
source for providing help to US operations in present and future conflict areas. 
  
2. Indigenous Auxiliaries: Recruiting in the Target Country 
The incorporation of assets on SF teams should facilitate recruiting indigenous 
auxiliaries, however, should SF teams have to recruit without the assistance of assets, this 
is one of the areas where Special Forces soldiers excel—interacting and developing 
rapport with indigenous people. It is one of the core strengths of Special Forces, which 
has generations of institutional knowledge and experience in working with and 
mobilizing groups of indigenous people that dates back to the days of the OSS and the 
Jedburgh teams of Europe and Detachment 101 in Burma. 
It is typical of insurgencies that only a small percentage of a population is in 
“hard core” support of the insurgents (this is the “2%” that T.E. Lawrence refers to). The 
rest of the population is capable of being persuaded to side with the authorities given the 
                                                 
40 Jennifer Yau, “The Foreign Born in the Armed Services,” Migration Policy Institute, 1 May 2005. 
[Web site]; available from http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFocus/print.cfm?ID=304; Internet; 
accessed 6 March 2006. Report states there were 69,299 foreign-born individuals on active duty in the 
armed forces of the United States as of December 2004. 
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proper incentives.    Recruiting for government forces is facilitated even more when an 
insurgency is not popular with the people.  During the Dhofar War in Oman, the British 
Special Air Service (SAS) was able to recruit irregulars in order to fight against the 
communist insurgents (see Case Study “Operation Storm”). In Angola, a small group of 
former South African Special Forces was able to create groups of irregulars out of the 
local population to fight a powerful anti-government rebel movement (see Case Study 
“Executive Outcomes in Angola”).  
Even in Iraq and Afghanistan, where anti-US sentiment and insurgent movements 
are strong, efforts to recruit for the Iraqi National Guard (ING), the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) and other security forces have been remarkably successful.  According to a 
recent White House Fact Sheet, there are over 120 Iraqi army and police combat 
battalions in the fight – each comprised of between 350 to 800 Iraqi forces.41 Likewise in 
Afghanistan, the US and Government of Afghanistan (GOA) are achieving similar 
successes in recruiting. The projected number of Afghan combat troops by the end of 
2005 is 43,000, and US training of these troops has frequently outpaced efforts to equip 
and sustain them.42 As of January 2005, Germany and the US have trained over 35,000 
national, highway and border police, and expect to reach the overall goal of training 
62,000 by Dec 2005.43  
While the reasons for joining the ranks of these forces likely range from practical 
(getting a steady paycheck and putting food on the table) to personal (patriotism, wanting 
to do their part to help rebuild their country, etc.), these statistics support the proposition 
that even in the midst of some of the least ideal circumstances it is still possible to recruit 
and gain a certain level of cooperation from the local populace. Offering people training, 
work, and decent wages can be a strong motivator that can sway even those with a 
preference for the insurgents’ cause.  
                                                 
41 The White House Fact Sheet: Training Iraqi Security Forces, 30 November 2005.  [Web site]; 
available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130.html;   Internet; accessed 16 
January 2006.  
 42 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report “Afghan Security:  Efforts to 
Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined,” GAO-05-
575, June 2005, p.11. 
 43 Ibid, 19. 
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Many more might be willing to join the ranks of the security forces if they are 
permitted to serve in their home towns and villages, where they have a vested interest in 
protecting people they already know and have lived among their whole lives. The best 
incentive, however, is to offer a better deal than the insurgents. This means going beyond 
offering better wages or gainful employment and working to solve the inequities, 
discontent and injustices that fuel insurgency and rebellion and cause people to turn 
against their government. 
While getting locals to join the ranks of the security forces is the first step, getting 
volunteers to leave their country for several weeks or months to receive training in the 
US might prove to be the more difficult task. If the insurgents have a strong presence in 
their area, individuals may be hesitant to leave their families for a lengthy period for fear 
of reprisals.  Providing an adequate cover story for their status and extra police/military 
protection for their families would be necessary in many circumstances. Security for 
trainees is a legitimate concern, as is potential insurgent infiltration into security forces. 
Both issues will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.   
 
C. TRAINING AUXILIARIES 
Training indigenous security forces is also one of the most complex tasks 
in developing an effective counterinsurgency strategy. Building new 
forces from scratch is difficult enough. It is even more difficult to take 
indigenous police and military forces with a tradition of incompetence and 
corruption and transform them into effective forces that can find and 
defeat insurgents without undermining the legitimacy of the government 
in the eyes of the people.44 
       -James S. Corum 
 
1. Training Security Forces for COIN 
While there are different approaches that can be taken to successfully recruit for 
the ranks of security forces and for training abroad, it is the training itself which is most 
important and can impact the success or failure of a COIN campaign.   While the 
numbers of military and police forces trained in Iraq and Afghanistan may seem 
                                                 
44 Corum, v.  
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impressive, these forces continue to struggle to establish security and stability and have 
been largely ineffective at quelling insurgent activity. To wit, the insurgencies have only 
become more violent and influential in both these countries. In Iraq, insurgents launched 
34,131 attacks in 2005, up 29% from 26,494 in 2004.45 In Afghanistan, 2005 was the 
deadliest year for US troops since the war began in late 2001.46 The manner in which the 
US struggles with turning over security to indigenous forces in both countries illustrates 
the need for more refined approaches by our military forces.  
The most successful counterinsurgency missions within the last century have 
relied on strategies that focused on employing indigenous police and paramilitary forces 
as the principle forces of the government, often attaining a higher priority than training 
the indigenous military.47 While the need for indigenous security forces in COIN is 
generally accepted, there is less of a consensus on what makes an effective security force 
for dealing with insurgents. The question of how to organize, train and employ such 
forces for this unique problem is not widely agreed upon or understood.  
Typical activities of insurgents range from simple criminal acts to small-scale 
military-style operations. Thus, it is often difficult to differentiate between the roles of 
police and military forces in counterinsurgency. Police and local security forces are the 
people’s first line of defense, but they must have the skills to survive and operate in what 
may still be a “battlefield environment.”  Indigenous security forces must be able to 
provide security for the population, but also must be able to conduct offensive operations 
against insurgents in order to expel them from their strongholds or deny them safe-
havens. The Auxiliary Training Program will ensure that local security forces are given 
the tools they need to operate between both extremes. The following sections will discuss 
an alternative approach to current methods being used to organize, train and employ 
security forces by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
                                                 
45 Rick Jervis, “Attacks in Iraq Jumped in 2005,” USA Today, 22 January 2006.  [Web site]; available 
from www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-01-22-iraq-statistics_x.htm; Internet, accessed 5 March 
2006. 
46 Bryan Bender, “US Endures deadliest Year in Afghanistan,” The Boston Globe, 3 July 2005. [Web 
site]; available from 
http://www.boston.com/news/world/middleeast/articles/2005/07/03/us_endures_deadliest_year_in_afghani
stan/; Internet, accessed 5 March 2006.  
47 Corum, 2. 
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2. Training Americans and US Foreign-Born as “Assets”    
Since assets would bypass the levels of training required by US military enlistees 
and officers, the burden of training them in basic skills would fall heavily on their 
assigned SFODAs.  Besides basic skills (like marksmanship, weapons training, first aid, 
survival, and small unit tactics), assets must be trained in team standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for situations that they may encounter while operating in an 
unconventional environment (immediate action drills, react to enemy contact, convoy 
operations, etc.). For the stateside training, the assets would be the conduits between the 
SF teams and their auxiliary partners. Assets would be relied upon to translate and help 
teach these skills and tradecraft to the indigenous auxiliaries on their respective SFODAs. 
To the extent possible, it is important that assets are integrated as part of the team and are 
not treated as outsiders, as this impression could come across negatively to the locals. It 
is also important that their efforts are in unity with the SF teams and that they working 
towards achieving the same goals.   
While the role of assets is to assist their respective SF teams in various capacities 
(such as being teacher/trainers, interpreters, negotiators, advisors, collecting and 
assessing intelligence, understanding basic military and policing measures and 
terminology, etc.), assets would not be expected to perform as “operators” at the level of 
SF soldiers. While assets will be required to perform an array of tasks, they would merely 
need to be familiar with these tasks, not “subject matter experts” at them.  
The most significant contributions the assets would make to the teams would be 
in the realm of language and regional expertise. The degree to which the assets will be 
valuable and effective for their respective SFODAs will depend largely on how much 
effort the SF team members make toward building a good working relationship, 
integrating them into the team’s operational strategy and most important: making the SF 
mission understandable to them so that they can import this to the indigenous auxiliaries 
and the local population.  
  
 3. Training Indigenous Auxiliary Forces 
SFODAs are well prepared to train auxiliaries in many tasks, ranging from basic 
military skills to more complex and advanced measures required of COIN. Basics skills 
30
such as weapons training, small unit tactics, reacting to enemy contact, survival, first aid, 
and communications would be taught first before the more complex tasks of urban 
combat training, surveillance, and intelligence collection and management.  
However, since many of the tasks required of local security forces for conducting 
COIN are more related to policing than typical military skills, certain training would have 
to be outsourced to private security companies, police instructors and/or other US federal 
agencies that fall under the realm of the Department of Justice.  Training a force of “beat 
cops” that can patrol neighborhoods and deal with everything from simple crime and 
gathering intelligence, to taking the lead in joint operations with state military forces to 
quell insurgent and terrorist activity is an ideal means to an end. Many of these tasks 
require teaching policing skills such as manning vehicle and personnel checkpoints, 
crowd control, conducting foot patrols, teaching basic detective skills, apprehending and 
handling suspects and other control measures designed to provide local security and law 
enforcement.   
 
4. Intelligence Training: Collection and Management 
Effective counterinsurgency operations depend more on accurate 
intelligence than any other factor.48 
-James S. Corum 
 
In an unconventional warfare environment, insurgents are generally in a position 
of information advantage, but have a firepower disadvantage when compared to the state.  
In contrast, the state has the firepower and resource advantage but lacks the intelligence 
and situational awareness necessary to capitalize on its strengths.49  To compensate for 
this “asymmetry,” the state often relies on “low leverage” and high cost means to defeat 
insurgents, i.e., using brute force, overwhelming firepower and mass warfare techniques 
to root out insurgents. In order for the state to create the “high leverage” means necessary 
                                                 
48 Corum, 10. 
 49 Gordon McCormick, Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare class notes (Naval Postgraduate School, Spring 
2005). 
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to gain the information advantage requires that auxiliaries and security forces be trained 
in the tradecraft of intelligence collection and management.   
Local police and security forces typically come across valuable information 
concerning insurgent activities during the course of their daily routines (making their 
rounds, walking their beats, manning control points, etc.). Efforts to train and cultivate 
these skills when building an auxiliary force are critical when it comes to improving the 
situational awareness of government and counterinsurgent forces. 
Intelligence collection can come from a variety of means. Auxiliaries and security 
forces would be taught how to conduct surveillance operations (particularly urban 
surveillance) where their ability to blend into the local population will be an enormous 
advantage. This includes plain-clothes operations to trail suspected insurgents without 
being detected, and how to discern when one is being followed and what actions to take.  
While conducting surveillance is an important task, local security forces will 
collect the majority of their information from informants.  Informants can be either 
witting or unwitting, and can be employed on an informal (incidental informants) or 
formal basis (recruited agents). Incidental informants typically provide information on a 
one-time basis. Recruited agents are selected and trained for continuous service in 
collecting information.  Utilizing informant networks and establishing less formalized 
programs like neighborhood watches, “home guards” and block monitors are critical to 
gaining situational awareness and achieving the level of local control that security forces 
need to “see everything that occurs” in their areas of operation. 
 While intelligence collection is vital, without good intelligence management 
information will not get down to whom it matters the most. According to Larry E. Cable, 
“…no intelligence product, regardless of substantial merit, has any utility unless it can be 
exploited quickly, vigorously, appropriately and without interorganization jurisdictional 
disputes.”50 Intelligence management means being able to foster cooperation among 
intelligence agencies and to share information between security organizations. Also 
auxiliary forces must be able to properly analyze information in order to produce useful 
intelligence products for their operations. Special Forces are trained in Low Level Source 
                                                 
50 Cable, 84. 
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Operations (LLSO) and have the capacity to teach this tradecraft to auxiliaries and 
indigenous security forces. Ultimately, it is reliable information that allows for effective 
operations and for security forces to tighten the noose around the insurgents and their 
support networks. 
 
5.  Utilizing Auxiliary Forces “On the Ground” 
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, or more doubtful of success, 
nor more dangerous to handle than to institute a new order of things. 
-Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, 1513  
 
Once the US asset force has been recruited and trained, the SF teams will deploy 
with their assets to the host nation to begin conducting operations. The assets will assist 
the SF teams in establishing rapport with the local leaders and will act as “liaisons” 
between the locals and the US forces.  With the assistance of the assets, the SF teams will 
begin organizing a security force out of the local population. From this developing 
security force, the SF teams will carefully select individuals who are “emerging leaders” 
and show potential as long-term investments for the security force. These individuals will 
be the “indigenous auxiliaries” that will accompany the SF teams back to the US for 
distance training.  
After several weeks or months of training together in the US, the SF teams and 
their assets and indigenous auxiliary counterparts will begin to establish mutual trust, 
close ties and professional working relationships. After the auxiliaries have completed 
their stateside training, they will accompany their respective SF teams back to the host 
nation.  Since the SF teams now have a small cadre of trained auxiliaries, they can more 
effectively divide their efforts between expanding and professionalizing the local security 
force and taking measures to ensure the physical security of the local population.  
In order to expand the local security force, the auxiliaries would use their local 
connections and influence to recruit more members into the force. Unlike the distance 
training the auxiliaries received back in the US, much of the security force training in 
country would be “on the job.” Less experienced recruits would be placed in static 
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security positions at critical local infrastructure and potential targets (water and power 
supplies, industry and economic sources, etc.), as this does not require much interaction 
with other locals or in-depth training. If US forces are currently securing these sites, then 
local forces must be phased-in to take over this responsibility as soon as possible.  
More experienced personnel would conduct more complex tasks like monitoring 
control points to population centers, conducting active patrols, and conducting 
surveillance operations throughout the AO. The role of the auxiliaries is to teach and 
oversee these activities and be the “eyes and ears” of the SF teams, since the teams 
cannot possibly be everywhere at once.  The auxiliaries would also use their local 
connections and pre-existing social ties to create intelligence networks to gather 
information on the insurgents and their support structure. This includes organizing less 
formal programs like neighborhood watches or “home guards” to report on insurgent 
activities.   
In cases where the host government is incapable of providing state military forces 
to assist the locals, SF teams, along with the help of the auxiliaries, must also create a 
strike force (or Quick Reaction Force (QRF)) that is capable of responding to 
emergencies and insurgent activities that overwhelm the security forces on the ground. 
This strike force would also be used for targeting operations against insurgents when 
actionable intelligence is acquired. The QRF would perform functions similar to a police 
force “SWAT team” that can capture or kill targeted personnel.    
SF teams would initially lead the indigenous forces in these COIN tasks, and then 
begin steadily transferring responsibility of these tasks over to the auxiliaries. As the 
auxiliaries and the local security forces gain confidence and experience in conducting 
these activities, the SF teams would assume advisor roles until the locals are ultimately 
ready to operate on their own.  This process would not happen overnight, and could take 
months (or years) to begin producing visible results.  It is for this reason the indirect 





D. LOGISTICS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS  
 1. Legal Precedents and Incentives for US Assets 
There are legal precedents that could be looked to for establishing a US asset 
force. The first is the Act of 1866, which fixed the force strength of the Military Peace 
Establishment of the United States. This act contained a clause authorizing the president 
to enlist a force of Indians to “act as scouts” and receive the pay and allowances of 
cavalry soldiers.51  Similarly, the Lodge Act of 1951, which was employed to recruit 
foreign born Americans from Eastern European countries during the Cold War, could be 
employed today to create asset forces for current operations, particularly in the Middle 
East. 
Although recruiting assets directly into the ranks of Special Forces could be an 
option, much like the purpose of the Lodge Act of 1951, there could be more efficient 
alternatives. Hiring assets as private government contractors, similar to the process of 
how government and military interpreters and members of contracted private security 
companies are hired, might prove to be advantageous. Potential recruits who might not 
prefer the long-term commitment required by enlisting in the Armed Forces might be 
more apt to sign up in the short-term as government contractors. This would also open up 
service to older individuals who would not meet the minimum age requirements of the 
military (recently changed to 39 years as the age cap for enlistment), but who would 
nevertheless provide valuable expertise.  This would also allow assets to bypass lengthy 
and unnecessary training that is required of regular enlistees (basic training, advanced 
individual training, airborne school and the Special Forces Qualification Course) and go 
directly to Special Forces units. Time saved by this process would be critical in situations 
where assets are needed for unforeseen and hard to predict conflicts which Special Forces 
must frequently respond to.  Hiring assets as contractors would also allow recruiters to 
entice potential recruits with higher wages (commensurate with officer or interpreter pay) 
and would make it easier to get rid of “undesirables.”   
In the event that the assets are not already US citizens, another option for 
recruiting would be to cover the assets under the 3 July 2002 Executive Order that allows 
for the “expedited naturalization for aliens and non-citizen nationals serving in an active-
                                                 
51 Dunlay, 44. 
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duty status in the Armed Forces of the United States during the period of war against 
terrorists of global reach.”52  Offering US citizenship in exchange for a commitment as 
an asset could be a very strong and sincere motivator for recruitment.  
Lastly, efforts must be made to appeal to foreigners’ sense of pride in their 
homeland.  Their heritage and connection to their place of birth and the opportunity to 
return to their native soil and bring freedom and stability could help leverage supporters, 
many of whom may have immediate or extended family living under oppressive 
conditions in the target country.   
 
2. Wages for Auxiliary Forces 
In order to recruit the best candidates, indigenous security forces should receive 
pay commensurate with what military forces in the target country are paid.  Any disparity 
in pay between police and military will likely contribute to difficulties in recruiting 
numbers and adversely impact the quality of applicants.  Auxiliary forces should be 
offered additional pay and bonuses for training in the US, and should receive higher pay 
(placed in a higher pay bracket) once they complete the training and return to their native 
country. This would encourage others to want to join the training and perhaps foster 
positive competitiveness within the security organization. Pay should be relative to the 
economic situation in a particular region, and would vary from country to country.  
Pay for assets should at least equal that of interpreters and other civilian 
contractors.  Wages earned in the target country would have to be substantially more than 
wages earned while back in the US conducting distance training. This would help in 
recruiting those who may be wary of entering a conflict area. Additional pay or bonuses 
should be considered for assets who can speak multiple languages or dialects in the target 
country, and for special skills such as prior military or law enforcement experience.  
 
                                                  
 52 White House Press Release, Expedited Naturalization Executive Order, 3 July 2002. [Web site]; 
available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/print/20020703-24.html; Internet; 
accessed 7 March 2006. This order waives the traditional five-year waiting period to apply for citizenship 
for non-US citizens serving in the Armed Forces. 
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3. Numbers and Duration of Training 
When it comes to producing trained auxiliary forces, the goal is quality, not 
quantity, so keeping the numbers at a manageable level is important.  “Assembly line” 
production of auxiliaries would not produce as effective a force as training smaller 
numbers on a more personalized and individual basis. The pace and scale of the Auxiliary 
Training Program is not intended to produce large quantities of security forces, but rather 
to create a loyal and highly trained core of personnel that US forces can rely on back in 
the target country.  
SFODAs would accommodate between 4-6 auxiliaries for training in the US 
between operational rotations, particularly in the early stages of the program.  These 
numbers would not overwhelm SF teams and are manageable enough to equip and 
provide individualized training, and necessary logistics. Based on training five auxiliaries 
per SFODA, (there are 18 SFODAs per SF battalion), each battalion would train 
approximately 90 auxiliaries (not including assets) per operational cycle. An ideal 
operational cycle would consist of a 6 month deployment followed by a 6 month recovery 
and training cycle. Keeping the numbers of auxiliaries small also prevents having to take 
too many people out of the fight, which is particularly important when every last person 
is critical. Over time, and once the insurgency begins to weaken, the numbers of trainees 
could be increased after the training has been refined.   
The duration of the training would depend largely on the stage of the operation 
and how well it is progressing.  In the initial portion of the operation, distance training 
should be kept short (limited to 4-8 weeks) to keep the maximum number of security 
forces in the fight and to make necessary adjustments and changes for training the next 
cycle of recruits. Ultimately, barring time for leave and recovery operations for the 
SFODAs, the goal would be to keep the auxiliaries in training during all or most of the 
teams’ down cycle.   
 
4. Housing for Auxiliaries in the US 
In the short-term, if the rotations of SF battalions are managed accordingly, 
auxiliaries in training could be housed with little to no additional cost.  All SF Groups 
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have facilities to house enlisted soldiers (Bachelor Enlisted Quarters or BEQs).  During a 
rotational deployment, soldiers living in the BEQ could have their belongings placed in 
storage for the duration of their deployment to make rooms available for the auxiliary 
trainees.  In the event that there are not enough rooms available, single SF and support 
soldiers could be authorized to receive basic allowance for housing (BAH) to live on the 
economy so that their rooms could be used for the auxiliaries. 
This housing plan would presume that an SF Group would maintain the mission 
for the duration of the operation and would manage the rotation of its battalions in and 
out of country on a predicable schedule. In the long-term, if the Auxiliary Training 
Program is deemed successful and made a permanent program, plans should be made to 
build barracks to accommodate future auxiliary trainees. 
 
5. Program Cost Estimates and Comparisons 
This section will look at the financial costs of the Auxiliary Training Program and 
compare them to costs of ongoing operations in the GWOT. In order to estimate the 
operating costs for the Auxiliary Training Program, the follow assumptions will be made: 
-The costs will be for one Special Forces battalion for one year. 
-One Special Forces battalion consists of 18 SFODAs. 
-A one year deployment cycle will consist of the SF battalion spending 6 months in the 
target country conducting operations and 6 months in the US conducting recovery and 
training. 
-Each SFODA will have one US asset and five indigenous auxiliaries (18 assets and 90 
indigenous auxiliaries per battalion). 
-US assets will be paid and average of $75,000 per year, or $6250 per month with no 
additional pay or allowances. 
-Indigenous auxiliaries will be paid $200 per month while in-country (average pay for 
indigenous police and military in Iraq and Afghanistan). 
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- Indigenous auxiliaries will receive $1,178.10 per month (the equivalent of an E1 with 
less than 4 months on the US military pay scale) for time spent training in the US, with 
no bonuses or additional allowances.  
-The SF battalion will be allotted an operational fund of $1,000,000 per year to cover 
additional costs like providing transportation in and out of the host nation, hiring 
additional trainers, providing individual equipment, ammunition and other training 
necessities, and unforeseen expenses and overhead costs.   
 
Based on these assumptions, the following is the raw, estimated cost for the 
Auxiliary Training Program: 
 
Table 5. Estimated Cost for the Auxiliary Training Program 
 
 
According to a recent Congressional Research Service report, if the FY2006 
supplemental request is approved, the total war-related cost to date for Iraq will be $320 
billion, and $89 billion for Afghanistan ($409 billion total for both operations).53 Taking 
into account that funding to train security forces was shifted from the Department of State 
to the Department of Defense in FY2005, the funding dedicated to train security forces is 
                                                 
53 Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and other Global War on Terror Operations Since 
9/11” (RL 33110, CRS Report for Congress, 24 April 2006), 8.  
 
• 90 Indigenous Auxiliaries 
– 6 months pay in country ($200 per month)  $108,000  
– 6 months pay in the US ($1,178.10 per month) $636,174 
 
• 18 US assets 
– $75,000 salary per year    $1,350,000 
 
• Operational Fund      $1,000,000 
 
• Estimated Total Cost  (per SF battalion, per year)  $3,094,174  
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$10.7 billion to date for Iraq with another $3.7 billion requested for FY2006 (for a total 
of $14.4 billion).54 In Afghanistan, the funding to train and equip their military and police 
totals $4.1 billion, with an additional $2.2 billion requested in the FY2006 supplemental 
(which would bring the total to $6.3 billion).55 The total funding provided for training 
security forces for both countries is $20.7 billion.  
As these statistics show, only a fraction of the money being spend for both 
operations is dedicated to improving security forces ($20.7 billion out of $409 billion, or 
about 5%).  For less than the price of one M1A2 Abrams tank ($3.5 million), we could 
fund the Auxiliary Training Program for an entire SF battalion for one year. 
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III. SUPPORTING DISCUSSION 
A. OTHER BENEFITS OF THE AUXILIARY TRAINING PROGRAM 
1. “Distance Training” and “Combined Formations” 
Distance/remote training for indigenous security forces is not a new idea.  In spite 
of the difficulties of dealing with an active armed communist insurgency, the British 
trained Malayan police and military personnel at schools and academies in England 
during the Malayan Emergency in the 1950’s.56  The US military trained El Salvadoran 
forces (as well as many other military personnel from Central and South America) in the 
US and Panama at the School of the Americas and during their struggle against leftist 
guerrillas in the 1980s. The US has been training other foreign military officers and 
NCOs at US military institutions for decades. More recently, the US government (along 
with 15 other nations) has provided instructors to conduct training for Iraqi security 
forces at the Jordan International Police Training Center outside Amman, Jordan.57    
There are many advantages to distance training. First, it provides a better training 
environment by getting trainees away from the distractions of being in a combat zone. 
Second, it is less costly in terms of money and resources that have to be spent concerning 
physical security and logistics to support a training site amidst an ongoing insurgency. 
Third, it helps avoid the public criticism, political liabilities and other difficulties that 
come with sending large numbers of troops and professional trainers into a conflict area 
to conduct training. 
However, in spite of all the benefits of distance training, there are some 
disadvantages to consider.  The most notable is that in nearly all cases when distance 
training is conducted, there is little continuous oversight for the employment or 
development of foreign personnel after their training is complete.  The “trainees” from 
these programs often disperse back to their home countries and very little is known about 
what direct impact or effectiveness was achieved by their schooling. Also, it is common 
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that the trainers for these programs are not directly involved in the conflict, and therefore 
do not share the same fate as their recruits once the training is complete.  This invites 
problems when there is little risk for trainers to push unqualified and poorly trained 
recruits through to meet quotas or please higher-ups.  Referring to the Iraqi recruits 
produced by the Jordan International Police Training Center, Army Captain Paula 
Broadwell notes: 
There are three main reasons why these forces will never be ready to 
defend their country: The wary, uncommitted recruits are immature and 
lackadaisical about the mission; the parsimonious training is inadequate; 
and accountability once recruits return to Iraq is inconsistent at best and 
lacks the return on investment one would expect. 58 
 
The Auxiliary Training Program proposed here capitalizes on the advantages of 
distance training in the US, but also incorporates the institutionalized “combined 
formations” that the Marines in the Banana Wars found so advantageous for producing 
the best individual training, as well as fostering local cooperation. According to Larry E. 
Cable:  
Marine officers and NCOs were able to overcome cultural and linguistic 
barriers as well as racial prejudice to cooperate effectively with and lead 
local troops in prolonged, stressful patrols…The marines also found that 
mixed patrols had the best effect on civilian morale, as they were a highly 
visible sign of what would later be termed “U.S. commitment.”59  
Another example of “combined formations” that worked exceptionally well 
occurred during WWII with the “Jedburgh” operations (see Case Study “The OSS in 
Southern France”). The Jedburghs were three-man teams assembled to infiltrate into 
German occupied Southern France to organize resistance movements. These teams were 
composed of one British or American officer, one French officer, and an enlisted 
communicator of any nationality. Jedburgh members trained for many months together in 
England before being inserted into France to conduct UW operations against the 
Germans. These mixed teams were able to capitalize on each other’s strengths—the 
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guerrilla warfare skills of the Brits and Americans, and the local expertise and influence 
of the French members—and were highly successful at tying up the German forces to 
prepare for the Allied invasions of Normandy and Southern France (note: for more 
examples of combined formations, see Case Studies on “Operation Storm” and 
“Executive Outcomes in Angola” in section).  
In a similar fashion, the combination of distance training and long-term 
partnerships of native personnel with SF teams would render the Auxiliary Training 
Program dramatically different from ongoing efforts to create indigenous COIN forces 
since the SFODAs would work hand in glove every day with the very people they have 
trained.  
 
2. Language Skills 
 Some of the immediate benefits of having US foreign born as auxiliaries are the 
language skills and cultural knowledge that are essential in conducting COIN—skills that 
cannot easily be replicated in language schools. For US military personnel, foreign 
language skills take months or years to acquire, often resulting in soldiers having only a 
rudimentary level of proficiency—far below what is necessary in order to conduct 
effective COIN and other missions abroad without the use of professional interpreters.  
Teaching foreign languages comes at great expense to the force in terms of money 
and time required to send soldiers away from their operational units. At the SOF Foreign 
Language Program at Ft. Bragg, NC, a Basic Military Language Course (BMLC) runs 
between 4-6 months.  At the Defense Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, CA, (the 
primary source of language training for the Department of Defense) language courses 
typically run from 12-18 months. While foreign language skills for Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) and other US military personnel are no doubt important, achieving a level 
of foreign language proficiency equal to that of native speakers is extremely difficult and 
would be the exception, not the rule.  Training cultural skills is an even greater challenge 
given time constraints and predominantly classroom environments. Local knowledge is 
something that can only be gained by living in the target country for an extended time—
and this kind of “immersion training” is often hard to come by. The “Catch-22” is that a 
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permissive environment is needed for this training. SOF also has other challenges when it 
comes to language capabilities to support its missions.  For example,  
1) It is common for SOF personnel to have received language training in 
more than three languages during their career; 2) SOF units often operate 
in geographic regions where there are numerous languages; 3) high 
operational demands and force structure limitations often require SOF 
personnel to operate in areas where their specific foreign language(s) are 
not spoken, and 4) it is difficult to determine the right languages and 
personnel mix to address a wide variety of unknown and hard-to-forecast 
small-scale conflicts.60 
 
Utilizing US foreign born individuals and their pre-existing language skills would 
be an efficient means to attain these much needed abilities in present and future conflict 
areas. 
 
3. Social Network Dynamics 
The Auxiliary Training Program relies on the employment of local indigenous 
security forces in order to create an environment inhospitable to insurgent activity. Locals 
make highly effective COIN forces because they have pre-existing social networks which 
are critical in fostering social movements and collective action.  According to Anna 
Simons, “extended families, lineages, clans, religious brotherhoods, and other indigenous 
associations represent latent networks, ideally suited for covert use by criminals, 
terrorists, and insurgents.”61  These same relationships and networks are also exploitable 
by counter-insurgent forces if conducted the right way.  
In Social Movements and Networks, Doug McAdams explains three dynamics of 
why people join insurgencies and other social movements. First, “recruits to a movement 
tend to know others who are already involved…prior social ties encourage entrance into a 
movement.”62 Second, “most social movements develop within established local 
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settings…e.g. recognized leaders, communication channels, networks of trust.”63 Third, 
“emerging movements tend to spread along established lines of interaction.”64   
According to McAdams’ theory, in conducting COIN operations it would be more 
effective to rely on locals who have access to these pre-existing social networks than it 
would be to rely on outside or centralized state forces that have no ties to the area. This 
also supports why the current strategy of using state military and police forces in 
Afghanistan and Iraq is encountering difficulties in establishing security and stability.  
When it comes to the challenge of tapping into these human networks, Anna 
Simons states, “…it is not so much access that is denied as that we’ve never committed 
the resources.”65  Working through auxiliaries will enhance our capabilities in gaining 
influence with the local population and will improve our ability to reach down into the 
community to gain reliable intelligence on the insurgents.  
 
4. Persistent Presence and Building Trust 
There is a cliché that the US Army didn’t fight the Vietnam War for nine years, 
but fought it one year, nine times over.  This implies that while the presence of US 
military forces in Vietnam spanned nearly a decade, there was no consideration for long-
term continuity as individuals were rotated after one year tours—most of whom never 
returned and those who did either came back working in a different capacity or in a 
different AO. In Iraq and Afghanistan today, many US service members have completed 
multiple tours of duty in either country (or both), but very few units or individuals return 
to operate in the same areas on a repeated basis.  
In general, for the US military to conduct missions abroad, it is very difficult 
politically to sustain a protracted presence in a hostile area, much less the kind of 
persistent presence that is required to achieve long-term success. Unfortunately, this often 
comes at the expense of being able to create an image of US commitment to locals in 
these operations.  From the point of view of the locals, it would be justifiably frustrating 
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to deal with different US personnel every few months, as they are essentially having to 
start from scratch in building rapport, relationships and trust with each new US unit that 
rotates through.   
There are different reasons for the US military’s inability to maintain a true 
persistent presence in conflict areas. First, there is a lack of understanding or lack of 
importance placed on the value of persistent presence. In reality, persistent presence is 
seen in the broad sense as a continuous presence of troops in an area, not in the more 
meaningful sense of keeping the same people dedicated to the same areas for protracted 
periods and/or multiple iterations. The difference may seem subtle, but is quite revealing 
in how the US military approaches unconventional wars and about how we perceive 
building trust in foreign cultures.  
According to Anna Simons, “because non-western means are typically person-to-
person and are built on relations of proven trust, we can neither easily insinuate ourselves 
nor readily penetrate these networks on the ground.”66 A true “committed presence” by 
US forces must be able to attain a deep embedded status with the locals, which would pay 
large dividends towards developing the kind of intimate local knowledge and access to 
vital social networks that are critical in COIN operations.  
Another factor in our inability to maintain a persistent presence is the bureaucratic 
nature of the US military itself. US military culture and bureaucracy treats service 
members as interchangeable pieces, keeping personnel constantly on the go by moving 
them to different duties stations or to different jobs within units.  This makes it nearly 
impossible to keep people in one place (particularly in a conflict area) for long enough to 
gain intimate local knowledge. However, not every deployed service member would have 
to return to the same area time after time. As long as at least some individuals are able to 
develop these ties with the locals on a repeated basis, this may be enough for the locals to 
perceive an image of US commitment. To this end, a true persistent presence of key 
individuals returning repeatedly to the same AOs is possible.   
If a USSF strategy for a COIN campaign is designed around the Auxiliary 
Training Program, this would essentially commit SFODAs to the same AOs by default. 
                                                 
66 Simons, 335. 
47
Commanders would be compelled to send their SFODAs back to the same areas for 
multiple iterations because there would be too much “friction” involved with the teams’ 
assets and indigenous auxiliaries in changing them to a different operational area. The 
Auxiliary Training Program would essentially build in a resistance to what is a natural 
tendency by commanders to move teams and units around inside a conflict area. The 
result is that the SFODAs will be able to reap the benefits of a true persistent presence: 
gaining intimate local knowledge, gaining access to indigenous social networks, and 
building trust and credibility with the locals.  
 
B.  PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Security and Vetting 
Potential insurgent infiltration of security forces is a major concern in COIN 
operations. This is an ongoing problem in Iraq, where insurgents have penetrated the 
ranks of the police and military at various levels.  The SFODAs would need to carefully 
hand-pick the auxiliary members, so they would be responsible for most of the vetting 
process. A detailed personnel record system may not be available in the host nation and, 
in many cases, the only means available to check the background of recruits is by 
consulting with other locals and trusted contacts who know the history of the personnel in 
question. The SFODAs can use their assets to assist in this process and get a feel for who 
is loyal and has a credible reputation within the community and who does not.  
New recruits would undergo a probationary period similar to what the French 
Resistance used in WWII (see Case Study “OSS in Southern France).  Under this 
probationary period, new recruits would be monitored and given duties that would not 
expose them to any sensitive information before background checks and vetting can be 
conducted.  Before being allowed to enter the US for training, auxiliaries would go 
through the same process, as well as more detailed screening through available host 
nation and US databases and “wanted lists” to ensure they are not working for or have 
ties to insurgents or extremist/anti-government groups.  
In addition to insurgent infiltration, reprisals against security force personnel and 
their families also must be addressed.  It is difficult to keep the identities of security force 
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personnel a secret from the population because their roles require them to maintain an 
active, visible presence within the community in order to be effective. Consequently, 
measures must be taken to ensure that their families are not threatened or intimidated by 
insurgents.  This may require frequent or additional patrols of the homes of security force 
personnel to ensure the safety of their families and to give the security force members 
peace of mind while they are out performing their duties.  
In extreme cases, where an insurgency is very strong, the families of security 
force members may have to be temporarily relocated (or sent to live with other relatives) 
until the insurgency is brought under control. To the extent possible, the stateside training 
portion of the Auxiliary Training Program must be kept secret from all locals except 
close family members and key personnel. Because auxiliaries would have to leave their 
country for several weeks or months at a time, their unprotected families would pose as 
“targets of opportunity” for the insurgents. The indigenous auxiliaries must have an 
adequate cover story for their whereabouts while they are conducting their distance 
training in the US.  
 
2. “Too Hot” for Operations? 
The Auxiliary Training Program requires that the environment and situation on 
the ground be permissive enough for USSF to operate effectively.  SFODAs are very 
agile and lethal when engaged in short duration combat. However, they are only lightly 
armed and operate in small numbers. Thus, SFODAs are not designed to be decisively 
engaged, or intended to conduct protracted “high-intensity” offensive operations.   
It would be difficult and dangerous to implement this plan in areas that are “non-
permissive” or overrun with insurgents. If the security situation is such that SF teams are 
only able to concentrate on force protection and their own self-preservation, they will not 
be able to dedicate sufficient time and resources to perform any other tasks required of 
the program (i.e., recruiting, training, conducting meetings and building rapport with 
locals, etc.).  
Situations where the environment is too hostile for USSF to operate would require 
conventional forces to conduct “clear and sweep” operations to eliminate the presence of 
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large numbers of armed insurgent forces before USSF could move into the area and begin 
conducting operations.  This is particularly so when insurgents have strongholds, “free 
zones” or “liberated areas” where government forces are unable to enter or operate. A 
case in point is the operation conducted by conventional US military forces to eliminate 
insurgents in the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004.  Support and stability operations were 
only able to resume there because the strong insurgent presence was removed by 
substantial force. This is in keeping with the concept of starting the Auxiliary Training 
Program in “softer” areas first before working into more difficult areas over time. 
 
3. Professionalizing the Force 
While the Auxiliary Training Program would facilitate teaching basic and 
practical skills to newly established local security forces, more advanced training would 
be required for their long-term success. Advanced training would include how to conduct 
and incorporate public campaigns like rewards and amnesty programs, weapons buy-back 
programs and other innovative measures. Also, indigenous security and local law 
enforcement personnel must be taught how to use non-military resources for civic action 
programs (i.e., improving water and electrical services, roads, schools and other 
infrastructure improvements) to relieve social and economic grievances and to leverage 
support from the population and away from the insurgents. Other aspects that must be 
incorporated into their training include classes in democracy, human rights, the Law of 
Land Warfare, legal interrogation practices, dealing with detainees, and learning to work 
with and through other government agencies. All are necessary for professionalizing a 
security force.   
In cases where it is necessary to rebuild an institution like a police force that has 
had a long history of corruption and incompetence, auxiliaries would be given classes in 
anti-corruption practices and how to avoid infiltration by insurgents. In certain cases it 
may be necessary to improve the public’s confidence in its police organization, which 
would require campaigns to fix the public’s image of the police, as well as concerted 
efforts to change the mindset of the police— that they exist to serve the people, not the 
other way around.   
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The Auxiliary Training Program is merely one measure that can be taken to help 
create government security infrastructure, and it has its limitations when it comes to 
producing a professional police/security force. In order to continue to professionalize a 
security force, there must be a progressive plan to educate and train members in more 
advanced skills, many of which are beyond the capabilities of USSF.  
In order to teach these skills, training may have to be outsourced to other 
organizations or agencies that have more experience in building professional police and 
law enforcement institutions.  In the mid-term, this may require key personnel and 
leaders to attend advanced schooling abroad. In the long-term, the US must help the host 
nation develop its own schools and training academies that would allow the host nation 
government to become self-sustaining. During the Malayan Emergency, selected 
Malayan police inspectors and officers who had been promoted from the NCO ranks 
were sent to England for a year to attend the UK police college course in Ryton and 
Hendon.67 Many other courses were created across the country to train thousands of 
individual police. However, even with a massive concerted effort, it still took years to 
reform and professionalize the police forces in Malaya. 
 Although many of these tasks lie outside of the purview of USSF and the 
Auxiliary Training Program, they must be taken into consideration for the long-term 
stability and success of the host nation.  
 
C. ROLES OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND USSF IN COIN  
1.  Conventional Forces in COIN 
Command relationships and “territorial disputes” between USSF and conventional 
forces operating in COIN environments are often difficult to overcome but are beyond 
the scope of this study. Arguably, the roles of USSF and conventional forces would be 
reversed in COIN:  USSF would undertake the main effort in establishing local control 
and conventional forces would play the supporting role. Without question, there are roles 
that conventional forces would be exceptionally well-suited for in supporting the efforts 
of USSF that would require a high degree of cooperation and coordination with the local 
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SFODAs. These roles include providing local security and quick-strike capabilities while 
local security forces are in their developmental stages.   
Conventional forces have the numbers, firepower, communications capability and 
mobility to move in quickly and secure newly occupied or liberated areas, but should 
only do so for as long as is necessary to phase in and replace them with indigenous local 
security forces. Insurgents do not typically operate in large formations, so rarely would 
conventional military forces need to organize for operations at the battalion level or 
higher. Rather, conventional military units should be organized to support police and 
local security forces in tactical operations and day to day security.  Conventional forces 
can also be the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to react to any insurgent activities that 
overwhelm local forces. A QRF is an on-call force that can bring lethal firepower and 
other capabilities to bear on insurgents and assist in situations where additional force is 
needed in a hurry.  
Another vital role for conventional forces is to employ Movement to Contact 
(MTC) teams that can patrol main supply routes (MSRs), borders, and the outer 
perimeters of towns and villages to keep insurgents at bay and until local control is 
established. This is an “economy of force” measure that allows indigenous security forces 
to concentrate their efforts on securing urban/built-up areas. These are all critical 
functions that must be performed until indigenous forces are able to take over the 
responsibility for these tasks themselves. These tasks would require little additional 
training or reorganization on the part of conventional forces, but would require redefining 
relationships and improving coordination between SOF and conventional forces in COIN 
and other unconventional operations.    
 
2. Special Forces and Training Foreign Forces 
One of the core missions of USSF is to conduct “military and paramilitary 
operations, predominantly conducted through, with or by indigenous or surrogate 
forces.”68 This is a role that was inherited from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 
WWII, which was regarded by USSF’s founder Col. Aaron Bank as the “operational 
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predecessors of Special Forces.”69 For years, US Special Forces have been called on to 
provide training for military and security forces of friendly foreign nations. Therefore, 
USSF are a logical choice for taking the lead in an Auxiliary Training Program. USSF are 
organizationally a “good fit” for such a program on many levels.  
First, SFODAs are designed to conduct “decentralized” operations. The teams are 
comprised of senior NCOs, a warrant officer and a commissioned officer, who are trained 
in specialties of communications, engineering, weapons, medical skills and staff planning 
procedures.  Teams are also regionally oriented and members are trained in foreign 
language skills and survival to help them operate independently and far away from the 
logistical trains that are required by conventional forces.  SF members are also trained 
extensively in intelligence gathering and Low Level Source Operations (LLSO) that 
allow them to collect HUMINT and create local networks of informants. 
USSF have generations of experience in working with indigenous forces. 
SFODAs frequently conduct Joint Combined Exchange for Training (JCETs) and Foreign 
Internal Defense (FID) missions to help friendly foreign nations improve their military 
capabilities and security infrastructure. The purpose of these missions is to train, assist, 
advise (and sometimes lead) foreign military and paramilitary units in tasks that help 
protect a foreign government from lawlessness, subversion and insurgency. While many 
of these missions are short in duration and limited in nature, some notable exceptions are 
the missions in El Salvador in the 1980s, and ongoing missions in the Philippines and 
Colombia.  This Auxiliary Training Program, however, diverges from these typical USSF 
missions in several ways.  
 First, JCET and FID missions typically train forces that are part of an 
established, centralized state security apparatus.  The intent of this proposal is to enable 
USSF teams to be able to form units from scratch at the local level, where an existing 
security apparatus does not exist, has not been formalized, or has been disbanded for the 
purpose of being replaced with one which meets with US policy goals (e.g., Iraq and 
Afghanistan).   Another difference is that training would not take place only in the target 
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county, but would occur in the US with the auxiliaries training directly with their 
respective SFODAs. 
While USSF is the best choice for conducting the Auxiliary Training Program, 
they cannot accomplish this mission alone.  USSF needs the support of conventional 
forces for matters of force protection, security and playing the role of “big brother” when 
insurgent forces become overly ambitious. USSF needs SOF assets like PSYOPS and 
Civil Affairs Teams to help with building infrastructure and other soft power measures 
that are critical to winning the support of the population and driving out insurgents.  
The next chapter will look at three case studies of specialized forces (similar to 
the composition and function of USSF) that conducted unconventional warfare operations 
in concert with indigenous forces.  In all three cases, the ability to work with locals and 
build grassroots support at the local level was critical to the strategic success of 













































IV. CASE STUDIES: SOF MISSIONS WITH INDIGENOUS & 
AUXILIARY FORCES 
A.  CASE STUDIES INTRODUCTION 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other specialized units have frequently 
relied on the assistance of the indigenous people in conflict areas in order to accomplish 
their missions.  The use and support of these indigenous groups (also referred to as 
auxiliaries, surrogates or irregulars) can range in size and scope depending on the mission 
and the objective.  Certain circumstances compel outside forces to rely on the local 
population, which can provide a spectrum of assistance ranging from materiel support, 
information and providing a safe haven, to actually conducting offensive military 
operations.  
This section will look at three illustrative examples:  the OSS in Southern France, 
the SAS in Oman, and a private military company called Executive Outcomes in Angola. 
These examples were chosen because they represent operations conducted by highly 
specialized units in protracted strategic campaigns that relied on indigenous forces.  Also, 
they were all conducted in unique circumstances and environments, under varying 
political conditions, and were all ultimately successful.  The OSS in Southern France was 
essentially an unconventional force that fought against a conventional adversary (the 
Jedburghs and the French Resistance vs. the Nazis and German regulars). The SAS in 
Oman were an unconventional force fighting an unconventional force (the SAS and 
Omani irregulars against the Communist insurgents). Lastly, the conflict in Angola from 
1993-1995 is an example of an elite force (Executive Outcomes and the Angolan army) 
which used a mixed strategy of unconventional and conventional tactics against the 
Angolan rebels (UNITA).  
These examples will demonstrate the broad utility and importance of using 
indigenous forces in a spectrum of circumstances, and will help us draw conclusions 
about when these forces should be utilized, and under what conditions these forces can 
prove critical to mission success. 
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B. JEDBURGHS: THE OSS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE (1944) 
 
 
                   70 
1. Background 
Southern France in WWII was under German occupation, and allied forces 
needed a plan to support the Maquis (French guerrilla groups) and the Forces Francaises 
de l’Interieur (FFI) in order to successfully support Operation Overlord (the invasion of 
Normandy) in June 1944, as well as Operation Dragoon (the invasion of Southern 
France) in August 1944. 
The U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) developed units called “Jedburghs” 
that were tasked to organize, train, supply and direct the French Resistance (the Maquis). 
The plan was for each section to organize and train the Maquis for the purpose of 
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delaying the movement of enemy reserves to the invasion lodgment area in Normandy; to 
harass enemy lines of communication in their area of operations in Southern France; and 
to conduct such sabotage operations as were directed by the Supreme Allied Commander, 
Mediterranean, in support of Operation Overlord.71 (Note: Jedburgh operations were also 
simultaneously conducted in Belgium and Holland for the same purposes.) 
 
2. The “Jeds” in Action 
The individual Jedburgh teams were broken down into 3-man sections: one 
British or American as the commander, a French officer to coordinate with the French 
Resistance, and an enlisted communicator who could be of any nationality. De Gaulle 
insisted that each team deploying to France have a French officer to act as the liaison (an 
“asset”) between the team and the French resistance.  
All of these personnel were highly trained individually. The team members also 
had strong input into the composition of their teams. The OSS command allowed the 
trainees to pick and choose their team members, and many teams dispersed and 
reassembled during training.  This technique ultimately proved successful as the 
individuals on the teams developed the best “feel” for who they could rely on. 
Before Operation Overlord and Operation Dragoon, the French Resistance was 
already conducting intelligence and sabotage operations. The mission of the Jedburgh 
teams was to improve the organization of the resistance and more properly align 
resistance activities with the needs of the allied conventional forces invading France. 
Little formal training was conducted in how to organize and train guerrillas, but the 
innovative and aggressive nature of the Jedburgh team members allowed them to figure 
out how to solve these problems on their own. The Jedburghs organized the French 
Resistance into small, more mobile and less detectable groups, and separated the 
intelligence and sabotage activities. Many Jedburgh teams also organized reserve Maquis 
cells called Le gaux.72  These reserve cells would be activated at a time and place when 
the invasion was imminent.  
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The Jedburgh teams were purposely limited in terms of their range of their 
guerrilla warfare activities in Southern France.73  These restrictions were put in place by 
Allied Forces Command so the Jedburghs would not “tip their hand” to the pending allied 
invasion of Southern France. At the same time, the Jedburghs were in constant 
competition with the FTP (a Communist French resistance group) to keep up guerrilla 
operations for recruitment purposes. The Jedburghs had to keep the size of the resistance 
movement down to a manageable level for reasons of operational security. A large force 
attracted a lot of attention and would therefore force the Germans to take aggressive 
action; without a pending invasion to distract them, the resistance would have also made 
a vulnerable target for the Germans should they have decided to conduct full scale 
counter-guerrilla operations.  There was a constant effort to keep the resistance 
movement “underground” and hidden from view. 
Infiltration by French spies who were loyal to the Germans was also an issue for 
the French Resistance and the Jedburghs and, therefore, recruiting new members became 
“one of the most dangerous of guerrilla activities.”74 Before new recruits were allowed to 
join the Maquis, they were given a probationary period, they were placed under 
surveillance while they were being vetted, and they were not allowed to meet the other 
members until their background checks were completed.75 
The Jedburghs’ big task was to get the French Resistance to conduct short and 
furious hit and run style ambushes against the enemy security forces, and not get 
decisively engaged. As the Germans began to suspect and prepare for a Mediterranean 
invasion, the resistance had to keep the enemy concerned over its routes of 
communication, so that it would have to commit more of its forces to securing its rear 
area instead of reinforcing its coastal defense forces. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The Jedburgh teams and the French Resistance proved to be highly effective in 
tying up the German forces and allowing the allied invasions to proceed, eventually 
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liberating France. This capacity for waging “unconventional war” was considered by Col. 
Aaron Bank to be “as integral a component of modern warfare as infantry, armor, and 
artillery.”76  These small but highly potent forces combined the military skills of US and 
British soldiers and the cultural skills and local expertise of the French Resistance. 
Working together, they helped prove the value of the support of the natives as 
“auxiliaries” in a conflict area, and the importance of highly trained and specialized units 
that were capable of leading resistance movements and handling complex tasks deep in 
enemy held territory.   The Jedburghs and the Maquis could not have been as successful 
had they operated independently of each other. By combining their efforts, they were able 
to maximize each other’s strengths and capabilities in order to accomplish their goals.  
 
C. OPERATION STORM: THE SAS IN OMAN (1970-1976)77 
 
 
                    78 
1. Background 
The Dhofar War began in the mid 1960s and ended in 1976, and was a classic 
counter-insurgency campaign fought by the British SAS (also referred to as “BATT”).79 
                                                 
76 Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos (NY: PublicAffairs, 2004), xiii. 
77 The British Special Air Service (SAS) is commonly referred to by its own members as BATT, short 
for “battalion.” 
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As fortune would have it, the war was fought at a time when the Labor Government was 
trying to disengage from Britain’s colonial commitments and wanted to keep the 
operation out of the press. In addition, the newly installed ruler of Oman, HM Sultan 
Qaboos, had continued his father’s policy of not allowing any press into his country (a 
policy that he would later reverse).  These two factors created an ideal state of affairs for 
both the SAS and the British Government to conduct a military campaign quietly, without 
interference and public scrutiny.   
The Dhofar War was unique because it was only the third campaign after Greece 
in the 1940s and Malaya in the 1950s and early 1960s to be won against a Communist 
armed insurrection.80 The soldiers of the 22 SAS were critical to this operation because 
they operated with the firqats,  which were bands of Dhofari ex-guerrillas raised to fight 
for the Sultan and “without whom the war could not have been won.” 81 
 
2. Making a Counter-Revolution in the Desert 
In the initial stages (before the SAS entered the conflict) the war was going very 
badly. The war against the Communist insurgents (the “adoo”) was being fought by the 
Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF), which were essentially regular forces (predominantly 
Arab), conventionally trained and conventionally employed against an unconventional 
enemy.  The general modus operandi of the SAF operations was to:  
 
…move by night in up to a battalion’s strength, on to the high ground, 
build sangars and wait for the enemy to attack. A long range battle would 
ensue during the day, usually with few casualties on either side, and the 
SAF would withdraw at last light with honor satisfied. 82 
 
The adoo were masterful at conducting “hit and run” style attacks against the SAF 
and offered no tangible targets against which the SAF could bring weaponry and 
strengths to bear. They were also adept at mining roads and lines of communication 
                                                 
 79 Dhofar is the southern province of Oman, inhabited by people who more resemble Ethiopians or 
Somalis than the true Arabs who inhabit the northern part of the country. 
80 Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War (Oxford, UK: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996), 11. 
81 Ibid, 12. 
82 Ibid, 24. 
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(LOCs), sniping at SAF patrols, and using other terrorist tactics, and could move about 
the region virtually uncontested. They received money, training and arms from the 
Communist Chinese and Soviet consulates in Aden, Yemen.83 Before the British stepped 
in, the adoo were also gathering more support and were able to recruit locals for their 
cause by using coercive and punitive operations to intimidate the civilian population into 
joining their movement.  
When the SAS joined the effort in 1970, their short term goal was to provide 
immediate relief to the people in areas where the Omani Government could not. Then, in 
the medium term they were to train Omanis to take over these tasks. The long term goal, 
however, lay in the hands of the Omani Government: to improve the lives of the Dhofari 
people by investing in resources and civil development to modernize the state. Military 
operations were simply a means to that end.84 
Rather than simply destroy the enemy, one of the goals of the SAS operations was 
to persuade the fighters to leave the adoo and the Communist revolution and join the 
government’s side. According to SAS Major General Tony Jeapes:  
 
 Persuading a man to join you is far cheaper than killing him. Words are 
far, far less expensive than bullets, let alone shells and bombs. Then, too, 
by killing him you merely deprive the enemy of one soldier. If he is 
persuaded to join the Government forces the enemy again becomes one 
less, but the Government forces become one more, a gain of plus two. 85 
 
This was not just a humane method of conducting a war, but a cost effective one 
as well. The basic strategy of the SAS was to begin in the “softer” areas, and gradually 
work their way into the more difficult areas.  They did this by working by, with, and 
through the locals to develop small groups of irregular forces called “firqats” made up of 
locals in each village. The SAS had three phases of firqat development:86  
 
 
                                                 
83 Jeapes, 26. 
84 Ibid, 33. 
85 Ibid, 39. 
86 Ibid, 167. 
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1. Raising and training them, sorting out their tribal problems and establishing a leader. 
2. The main operational phase: getting a company or battalion of SAF and as many 
BATTs (SAS battalions) as they could, and establishing them in their tribal area and 
helping them to clear it. 
3. Getting the civil action going: a well drilled, a clinic, school and shop built, and so 
on.  
 
After these three phases were complete, the SAS would withdraw and hand over 
the areas to firqat forces, freeing up men to start again with another firqat.87 Careful 
orchestration on the part of the SAS was needed in order to balance offensive/kinetic 
operations against the adoo with psychological operations (PSYOPS) campaigns to 
encourage defection, intelligence gathering, and civil development. The SAS also had to 
find innovative solutions to problems such as determining the ideal firqat strength, 
handling their pay, and settling complex tribal disputes that could hamper progress.     
The strategy slowly started to work as the SAS expanded their influence and 
raised more firqats.  As more and more defectors came from the adoo, intelligence on 
enemy positions and activity began to produce more effective offensive military 
operations. The adoo front began to alienate the population, despite amnesty programs, 
payment to martyrs’ widows, and the announcement that Islam would now be tolerated.  
The adoo could not keep pace with the success of the civil development programs and 
information services that were “driving a wedge between Islam and Communism.” 88 
Although the firqats and the SAF did participate together in certain major 
offensives, these were left largely to the SAF. The firqats came to complement their 
conventional brethren by working hand in glove in defeating the adoo. The firqats were 
able to maintain a long-term presence with their communities and had an understanding 
of the local situation that the SAF could not have effectively achieved, but when it came 
to the conventional military tactics of a disciplined force, they needed the SAF.  Neither 
force could have won the war alone.        
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3. Conclusion 
By the middle of 1975, the adoo in most of the country had been split into small 
bands that were on the run. They were still dangerous, but no longer had any chance of 
winning a revolution. In September 1976, the last SAS squadron left Dhofar for good 
after an uninterrupted presence of six years. By training and using the firqats to establish 
security and control at the local level, the SAS displayed a great conceptual 
understanding of how to defeat an insurgency.  The SAS understood that the answer to 
the problem had to be found by the Omanis themselves. Tony Jeapes notes, “Vietnam had 
shown that there is no future for a foreign army of intervention in a national revolutionary 
war.”89 To sum up the power of using Special Operations in concert with irregular 
indigenous forces, SAS Brigadier John Akehurst concluded, “Put a BATT with a firqat 
and you triple your output.”90  
 
D. EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES IN ANGOLA (1993-1995)91 
 
 
                    92 
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1. Background 
Executive Outcomes (EO), the most successful private army in recent history, was 
founded as a “military advisory company,” whose ranks consisted of experienced South 
African Defense Force (SADF) soldiers, most having fought side-by-side with the 
UNITA rebels in Angola, who were struggling for democracy against the communist-
backed (Cuban and Soviet) forces of the Marxist Angolan government (MPLA).  The 
men of EO have a unique and unusual perspective of fighting on both sides of a bloody 
insurgency. Most of EO’s founding personnel supported the Angolan rebels (UNITA) 
while serving in the ranks of the South African Defense Force, then came to switch sides 
and, as a private army, began helping their former adversaries (the Angolan government) 
defeat their long time allies. 
 
2. Defeating UNITA: Fighting Fire with Fire 
As a private military company, EO was contracted by the Angolan government in 
1993 to regain control of a valuable petroleum complex taken over by the rebel UNITA 
forces.  After a decisive victory over UNITA forces and the return of the petroleum 
complex to the Angolan government, EO’s actions quickly became legendary and 
controversial because EO’s numbers were so small and because EO was an “outsourced” 
or mercenary army (EO members were quickly labeled by the media and some of their 
South African counterparts as traitors).  Nevertheless, EO was given an exclusive 
contract to train and advise a brigade-sized element of the Armed Forces of Angola 
(FAA) to conduct counter-insurgency operations against the UNITA forces. When 
developing the training concept for the FAA, EO’s founder Eeben Barlow said: 
 
…to train the whole army, we’ll have to start from the grass roots-level 
with basic training, because there is no way we are going to change the 
mindset of the Angolan soldier until he wants it changed. If we could train 
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the other troops would want to have the same—and that was the idea we 
approached the Angolan army with: to set up a team for them and train a 
brigade.93  
 
EO essentially had to start from scratch, building a counter-insurgent force from 
the ground up. They also had to conduct damage control on the public perception of the 
FAA who, in the eyes of the international media, were being compared to Charles 
Taylor’s regime in Liberia for sending young children (13 to 15 years old) into battle.  
EO insisted on a minimum age of 16 for their recruits, a stance that the top FAA 
reluctantly accepted.94  
EO had to worry about perception problems with the locals as well. In order to 
gain rapport with the frightened and distrustful local recruits, EO used engineers to purify 
water for the locals, and set up a clinic to treat them for malaria, intestinal parasites, 
malnutrition, do dental work, and address other medical problems they had. Because EO 
recognized that they had to win over the locals first before they could make other 
progress, new and interesting doors began opening. More FAA generals started lending 
support to their effort by providing weapons and supplies, and better quality recruits 
began arriving.95 
EO began producing trained soldiers, but because of the intensity of the conflict 
and due to the lack of competent soldiers in the FAA, each newly trained class was sent 
directly to the front lines. “UNITA grudgingly admitted that the South African-trained 
troops they encountered were far better than the run-of-the-mill government soldiers they 
normally faced.”96 Although the quality of the troops was better, the desperateness of the 
situation at the front kept EO initially from being able to follow through on their original 
concept of amalgamating the FAA with EO elements and continuing their training on the 
job.  
EO found they had their work cut out for them in trying to reverse the rigid 
doctrine of the conventionally minded FAA, who had been taught by the Soviets with 
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their unbending “Fulda Gap” mentality of using overwhelming numbers to defeat the 
enemy. The FAA were also constantly reacting to the “hit and run” guerrilla tactics of 
UNITA instead of seizing and holding ground.  
EO began conducting combined operations with elements of its specially trained 
16th Brigade, using conventional attacks to overtake UNITA fortifications and logistics 
that were susceptible to smaller unit tactics. They also employed guerrilla “hit and run” 
style attacks on more fortified bases with mortars and small arms, and conducted 
ambushes against high level UNITA leadership and their convoys. EO also began to 
teach the FAA how to effectively employ air power, artillery and armor into their 
operations, as well as how to conduct air and ground reconnaissance missions in order to 
paint a picture of the enemy situation. 
EO’s hegemony over operations slowly began to bear fruit. Angolan government 
troops methodically began to take back contested and UNITA-occupied areas. EO’s 
insistence on using less heavy-handed and more humane tactics was critical in helping to 
smooth over the relationship with the locals, who cautiously began siding with the 
government. In contrast, UNITA’s actions began to become more desperate and brutal, to 
include sometimes executing and burning locals and committing other atrocities as they 
withdrew from the towns and villages.  
After a grueling final offensive to take back the heavily defended town of Cacolo 
in 1995, EO and the FAA delivered such a crushing blow that they sent UNITA into 
retreat. “The next month UNITA agreed to talks on ending the war and United Nations 
monitors began arriving.”97         
 
3. Conclusion 
EO’s stunning success in beating and driving back the rebels forced UNITA to the 
negotiating table and brought a temporary end to the conflict. EO’s successes, however, 
did not come without failures and losses, and many EO personnel were missing or killed 
in the conflict. Ultimately, EO was forced to leave the country as a part of the 
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negotiations (perhaps a tribute to their effectiveness) and UNITA resumed hostilities 
once the United Nations troops were brought in and EO had departed.  
There were various reasons for EO’s success in Angola.  “It was in the right 
place—southern Africa—at the right time, when a desperate Angolan government (and, 
ironically enough, former enemy) needed help. More practically, its staff of professional 
warriors had learned their trade in the South African Defense Force and shared a 
corporate philosophy of aggressive, unconventional warfare against numerically and 
materially superior opponents.”98  
A group of less than 300 highly trained men—who understood their environment, 
unconventional warfare, economy of force, and the value of earning rapport with the 
local populace and incorporating them into their efforts—had an extraordinary impact on 
the insurgency in Angola. By training, leading and participating in operations with their 
Angolan counterparts, they were able to increase their effectiveness in defeating the 
UNITA rebels. EO’s ability to recruit and professionalize a group of local “irregulars” 
and change the mindset of a military bent on using conventional measures demonstrated a 
highly effective implementation of COIN at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.  
 
E. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
In all three cases depicted above, these highly specialized units relied on locals for 
their success in protracted strategic campaigns against numerically and materially 
superior forces. Perfect (or near perfect) human intelligence was critical to day-to-day 
operations—intelligence which could not have been provided without the assistance and 
employment of auxiliaries, irregulars, and locals.  
All missions were limited in their application of personnel and resources because 
the missions either required a level of secrecy that kept forces to a minimum, or they 
were forced to limit their size (economy of force) due to the necessity of allocating 
resources for ongoing efforts elsewhere (like the Allied invasion of France). In all three 
cases this happened to work to these units’ advantage by forcing them to economize and 
maximize their efficiency over larger forces.   
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The most important skill displayed by these specialized units was their 
understanding of the importance of building rapport with the locals and integrating them 
into the struggle with the effect that they had a clear stake in the outcome of the conflict. 
It also required a level of wisdom in realizing that these forces also had their limitations, 
particularly when they were overextended and overworked in a conventional capacity.  
Working with indigenous people required a special mindset and could not have 
been accomplished by just any soldiers.  The average conventional soldier finds dealing 
with irregulars “a frustrating experience because they are anathema to all his military 
upbringing.”99 It takes a great deal of patience, tolerance and understanding to deal with 
irregulars. Unlike most regular professional soldiers—who pride themselves on virtues of 
honor, discipline and selflessness— irregulars are often dishonest, unruly and selfish.   
Although auxiliaries and indigenous groups present certain limitations and come 
with their own unique set of challenges, it seems to be in the best interest of our military 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The long war against terrorist networks extends far beyond the borders of 
Iraq and Afghanistan and includes many operations characterized by 
irregular warfare—operations in which the enemy is not a regular military 
force of a nation-state.100 
     -2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 
 
This thesis has argued that the nature of warfare has changed and Low Intensity 
Conflicts (LICs) and unconventional wars have surpassed large-scale conventional 
conflicts as the biggest threat to peace and global stability.   
There is ample literature that now argues that the US military has been organized, 
trained and equipped to deal with threats from other state military forces, and is largely 
unprepared to conduct COIN and UW missions. Because unconventional/insurgent wars 
operate on wholly different principles than conventional wars, new approaches must be 
taken to transform US military capabilities.  Measures that focus purely on the 
destruction of the enemy no longer suffice—unconventional wars require our forces to 
have the ability to change the environment at the grass roots level to render the insurgents 
ineffectual.  
In order to change the environment, security and control must be attained locally, 
and more effective and innovative measures are needed in order to achieve this. 
Experiences drawn from the US Marines in the Banana Wars and the US Cavalry during 
the Plains Indian Wars show that using auxiliary forces is a highly effective method for 
establishing control at the local level. As demonstrated by their history and recent actions 
abroad, Special Forces are well suited for the task of training and utilizing auxiliaries in 
counter-insurgency operations.  
  This thesis presents an argument for the creation of an Auxiliary Training 
Program whose components would be:  an asset force comprised of foreign-born US 
citizens with language and local expertise; indigenous auxiliaries which are recruited 
directly out of the local population in the target country; and stateside training which uses                                                  
100 2006 QDR, 11. 
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the advantages of “distance training” in the US and “combined formations” with Special 
Forces teams to greatly enhance US counter-insurgency capabilities.  
Recommendations for recruiting, training and employing auxiliaries in counter-
insurgency operations have also been considered, along with cost estimates to show that 
the Auxiliary Training Program can be conducted for a fraction of what is being spent to 
rebuild and train security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
While the Auxiliary Training Program offers clear advantages for using distance 
training and combined formations to increase effectiveness, enhance language 
capabilities, build and then rely on pre-existing social networks to maintain a persistent 
presence and build trust.  Abroad, we’d be remiss not to acknowledge the potential 
disadvantages and limitations. These include problems with security and vetting 
(insurgent infiltration); needing the right kind of environment to be effective (a semi-
permissive environment at a minimum) and issues and limitations when it comes to the 
long-term professionalizing of a host nation security force.  
Also worth considering are the roles conventional units and Special Forces in 
counterinsurgency, and their advantages and limitations in long-term COIN operations. 
USSF is well suited for the mission of working with locals, but cannot be successful 
alone. Conventional forces would need to play a supporting role by providing security, 
force protection and the capability to react to insurgent forces that become too much to 
handle for USSF and local security forces.  There must be cooperation and close 
coordination with conventional units and other SOF assets like PSYOPS, Civil Affairs, 
and other soft-power capabilities.  
History indicates that SOF and other specialized units can be highly effective 
when their abilities are combined with the local knowledge and cultural expertise of 
indigenous auxiliary forces.  We see this in such disparate examples as the Jedburgh 
teams of Southern France in WWII, the SAS and the Omani irregulars in the Dhofar War 
(1970-1976), and Executive Outcomes and irregular forces in Angola in the mid 1990s. 
As these three cases make clear, elite units working with auxiliary forces can successfully 
defeat their numerically superior opponents in protracted, strategic conflicts.  
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Insurgent wars and Low Intensity Conflicts are difficult, complex, and require far 
more than an “off the shelf” solution that the US military likes to apply to operations. The 
US military is slowly recognizing the need to be able to more efficiently conduct 
unconventional wars in order to project US power and national strategy around the globe. 
The Auxiliary Training Program is merely one step towards improving our capabilities in 
COIN operations and in Low Intensity Conflicts.  The Auxiliary Training Program 
combines measures that have proven effective in a variety of environments, particularly 
in COIN, irregular wars and other sub-state conflicts, where winning the population, not 
defeating the enemy force, is the objective.   
More than 2400 years ago, the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu said, “What 
is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy’s strategy.”101 Current measures 
being used by our military forces abroad are encountering great difficulty and we have 
not yet achieved resounding success against insurgent forces. The vast majority of our 
efforts and resources in Iraq and Afghanistan have been oriented towards finding and 
defeating the enemy—measures that we have relied on to bring us success in the biggest 
wars of the last century, but are largely irrelevant in fighting “people’s wars.” One reason 
why we struggle in these wars today is that our strategy has been to attack the enemy, not 
to attack his strategy. While we scramble desperately to hunt for the ever elusive 
insurgent, he is patiently and methodically using the population as a conduit to help him 
achieve his vision of social change and revolution. Only by adopting measures that first 
focus on securing the local population will we be able to dry up insurgent resources and 
support bases and bring stability and security to unstable regions of the world.  By 
capitalizing on these principles, the Auxiliary Training Program would play a significant 
role in changing the way we fight and win future wars.  
Recommendations for further study include: more detailed research into the long- 
term effects of distance training and how to avoid consequences such as creating a 
“privileged” or “elite” class of people; examining the challenges of “Westernizing” the 
“non-West” areas of the world; and how to import American ideals abroad through key 
individuals.  
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